Turkish influence in the South Caucasus and Levant: the consequences for NATO and the EU by Thompson, Eric S.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2013-09
Turkish influence in the South Caucasus and
Levant: the consequences for NATO and the EU
Thompson, Eric S.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
TURKISH INFLUENCE IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND 









Thesis Co-Advisors:  Donald Abenheim 
 Victoria Clement 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2013 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
TURKISH INFLUENCE IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND LEVANT: THE 
CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO AND THE EU 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Eric S. Thompson 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.  IRB protocol number _______N/A__________ 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This thesis examines Turkey’s growth as a power under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma 
Partisi; AKP) government, and the implications for European institutions. In particular, this study:  
 
• reflects on the intertwined historical connection between Turkey and Europe in the South Caucasus and 
Levant; 
• examines the extent to which Turkey’s interest and policies under the AKP and European Union (EU)-
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interest and policies intersect and diverge in the two 
regions; and  
• evaluates the implications and avenues for cooperation in areas of common interest.  
 
The analysis and assessment shows Turkey’s policies in the South Caucasus dovetail with EU-NATO regional 
interest and are not politically Islamic but pragmatic in nature.  
In the Levant, similar to the South Caucasus, the AKP’s interest and policies are somewhat aligned to those of EU-
NATO; however, the regions volatility and Turkey’s cultural and religious linkages to the Middle East are an added 
dimension which shapes the AKP’s independent foreign policy trajectory. Additionally, realpolitik, not Islamism, 






14. SUBJECT TERMS Turkey, foreign policy, Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma 
Partisi; AKP), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), South Caucasus, 
Levant 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
95 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
TURKISH INFLUENCE IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND LEVANT: THE 
CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO AND THE EU 
 
 
Eric S. Thompson 
Lieutenant Colonel 
B.S., University of Arizona, 1994 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
























Mohammed Hafez, PhD 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 
 iv




This thesis examines Turkey’s growth as a power under the Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi; AKP) government, and the implications for European 
institutions. In particular, this study:  
 reflects on the intertwined historical connection between Turkey and Europe 
in the South Caucasus and Levant; 
 examines the extent to which Turkey’s interest and policies under the AKP 
and European Union (EU)-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
interest and policies intersect and diverge in the two regions; and  
 evaluates the implications and avenues for cooperation in areas of common 
interest.  
The analysis and assessment shows Turkey’s policies in the South Caucasus 
dovetail with EU-NATO regional interest and are not politically Islamic but pragmatic in 
nature.  
In the Levant, similar to the South Caucasus, the AKP’s interest and policies are 
somewhat aligned to those of EU-NATO; however, the regions volatility and Turkey’s 
cultural and religious linkages to the Middle East are an added dimension which shapes 
the AKP’s independent foreign policy trajectory. Additionally, realpolitik, not Islamism, 
rules the AKP’s interaction with both state and non-state regional political actors.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
The transformation of the international system in the 21st century has seen the 
rise of Turkey as a middle-power with aspirations to be a great power in the shifting 
international order of Eurasia and the Middle East. Should this transformation of 
Turkey’s national security interest and foreign policy actions concern the makers of 
policy in the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)? As 
this study has been written, the civil war in Syria among pro and anti-Assad factions has 
raged, and spilled onto Turkish territory at the same time that a wave of anti-Erdogan 
protest erupted in Istanbul and elsewhere in early June 2013. With these events in mind, 
the present study analyzes the consequences and opportunities for NATO and the EU 
presented by Turkey’s widening foreign policy objectives and national interest in two 
volatile geographic regions; the Caucasus and the Levant. Moreover, this study seeks to 
understand how Turkey’s political-geography and relationships with entities and states 
outside of NATO and the EU inform and interact with EU-NATO interest and strategies. 
Are actions under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) 
signs of a Turkey drifting away from the West or do they complement the desires of 
Ankara’s Euro-Atlantic allies?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Geography, economy, and security play an important role in Turkey’s strategic 
outlook. Astride Asia and Europe, Turkey has always been a pivot of the fate of the 
eastern Mediterranean and the European system of states from the Ottoman Empire’s 
epoch to the eclipse. During which time the Ottoman’s penetrated deep into seventeenth 
century Europe leaving a lasting legacy, particularly in the Balkans. Since 1952 at the 
latest, Turkey has occupied a key geostrategic location along the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s (NATO) southeastern frontier, an area at the nexus of multiple regions 
and sub-regions: the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East whose fate 
in the story of nations and conflict needs little explanation.  
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Turkey’s newfound confidence and foreign policy approach in the last decade is 
encouraged by economic growth and the opportunities it presents for increased regional 
and international influence and trade. Turkey’s new direction creates questions 
concerning its future relationship with the West. This opportunity is made more so by the 
waning fortunes of the western allies in their variety and complexity. 
Washington is shifting strategic resources and political energy to the Asia-Pacific 
region in anticipation of perceived future threats to U.S. national interest. Despite the 
troubles faced by the EU and NATO in the wake of the recent past with extended warfare 
and economic crisis, Europe’s pursuit of geopolitical stability along its periphery must 
continue and fill the void created by the shift in U.S. strategic focus. Importantly, 21 
countries are members of both NATO and the EU; consequently, the EU-NATO 
relationship is nearly symbiotic and finds its most problematic juncture in the relationship 
with Turkey.1 The EU, for instance, utilizes NATO forces in support of common 
objectives in the Balkans under operations such as EU military operation Althea in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which began in 2004. The EU’s focus on the current economic 
crisis; and NATO’s weariness from over ten years in Afghanistan provides Ankara the 
opportunity to increase its influence in the South Caucasus, and Middle East; regions 
which Russia and Iran potentially seek further influence at the expense of NATO and the 
EU. 
Turkey is located at the nexus of 70 percent of the world’s oil and gas reserves 
and is an important transit country for both Caspian and Middle East energy.2 In both 
NATO and EU strategic documents energy is defined as an important element in 
European security. NATO’s Strategic Concept 2010 and 2012 Chicago Summit 
Declaration, and the EU’s 2003 European Security Strategy and a February 2011 
presentation to the European Council by EC President, Jose Manuel Barroso, detail 
                                                 
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, EU-NATO: A Strategic Partnership, Last modified October 29, 
2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm. 
2 Hasan Alsancak, “The Role of Turkey in Global Energy: Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security,” 
http://www.ensec.org/; International Energy Agency, “Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Turkey,” 2009, 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/turkey2009.pdf, 8. 
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energy security and source diversification as NATO and EU concerns.3 Europe’s energy 
demands are expected to remain constant for the next 15 to 20 years but the demands of 
China, India, and other emerging economies is expected to create pressure.4 Additionally, 
Europe imports more than half the oil and gas it consumes; dependence on imports is 
expected to increase through 2030.5 Germany, for example, plans to eliminate its nuclear 
power-plants by 2020 creating deepening dependence on Russia gas.6 Russia is the 
dominate supplier of oil and natural gas to Central and Western Europe and supplies EU 
countries with roughly 35 percent of crude oil and 32 percent of natural gas 
requirements.7 Developing Caspian energy sources with Turkey as the primary transit 
nation provides NATO and the EU the means to increase energy source diversification, 
positively affect competitiveness in the EU energy market, and reduce the potential for 
states such as Russia to use energy as a political tool. 
Civil military relations in Turkey form an aspect of the question at hand and the 
determination of Turkey’s role as a regional power in the years to come. The primacy of 
pluralistic civilian authority over that of the military is evident in Turkey. The emergence 
of the AKP in 2002 signaled popular desire for a larger, public role for Islam in Turkish 
society. The popular support provided to the AKP weakened the military’s position as 
enforcer of Kemalist dogma. In many respects the vote also simply signaled the public’s 
impatience with the prior government’s corruption.8 In terms of NATO, the increased 
influence of the AKP government and a foreign policy migrating from the West to the 
East must be addressed. A shift to the East does not constitute Turkish dismissal of its 
western link; however, NATO and the EU must determine the opportunities and potential 
                                                 
3 European Commission, Energy Priorities for Europe, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/energy3_en.pdf.  
4 European Commission, Background on Energy in Europe, 4 February 2011. 
5 Ibid. 
6 United States Senate, “Energy and Security from the Caspian to Europe,” December 12, 2012 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 9.   
7 European Commission, Energy production and imports, Eurostat, August 2012, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports. 
8 “Rotten Eggs Unbroken Turkey’s Campaign Against Corruption in High Places Seems to be 
Faltering,” The Economist, November 1, 2001, http://www.economist.com/node/842934. 
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consequences presented by Turkish foreign policy. Importantly, Turkey can complement 
or complicate NATO interest defined in the alliance’s 2010 Strategy, such as: NATO-
Russia cooperation, EU-NATO cooperation, missile defense, and water scarcity. 
Common EU-NATO interest such as energy security; specifically, the demand for 
diversified sources of oil and gas, and the Arab-Israeli conflict are potentially influenced 
by Turkish unilateral activities. 
Turkey’s EU membership goal adulterated the power of the Kemalist camp, 
specifically the military. EU criteria for membership demands democratization (the basic 
requirement for EU membership) demands subjugation of the military to civilian 
authority; therefore, the Turkish military, the self-proclaimed guardians of Kemalism 
reluctantly acquiesced and submitted authority to civilian leaders. Ironically, by popular 
vote, the moderately Islamist AKP took power in 2002 as a consequence of Turkey’s 
push for EU membership. The AKP party then developed political, social, and legislative 
reforms consistent with the EU’s Copenhagen criteria.9 In 2004 the European Council 
proclaimed Turkey met the required political pre-conditions (democratic principles, rule 
of law, human rights, protection of minorities) for the accession process.10 
The elongated accession process and the doubts for Turkish membership 
conveyed by the EU’s two most influential members (Germany and France) play a role in 
Turkey’s unilateral approach and cultivation of Black Sea, Caucasian, and Middle 
Eastern economic and political ties. Despite Turkey’s rejection by the EU, Turkey is 
economically, if not, institutionally integrated with EU member states. EU exports to 
Turkey, for instance, totaled roughly 74 billion euro in 2012; Turkish exports to Europe 
totaled approximately 47 billion euro (see Table 1).11  
                                                 
9 Kemal Kirişci, “Democracy Diffusion: The Turkish Experience,” in Turkey and It’s Neighbors, 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012), 153. 
10 European Union, Turkey-Presidency Conclusions, 16–17 December 2004, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/presidency_conclusions16_17_12_04_en.pdf. 
11 Thomas Straubhaar, “Turkey as an Economic Neighbor,” in Turkey and It’s Neighbors, 
(Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012), 186. 
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Table 1.   EU-Turkey Bilateral Trade.12 
Security is another important component of the Turkey-Europe relationship. 
Turkey and Europe are part of an interconnected security environment which links the 
two by geography, culture, and history. Ankara’s relevance to NATO, defined initially by 
Cold War defense requirements, is now legitimated by Turkey’s place as a regional 
power along the European periphery. 
Turkey’s role in post-Cold War European security is evidenced by its contribution 
to NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Turkey supported NATO Peace-
keeping operations in the Balkans by providing land forces, headquarters elements, and 
fighter squadrons during both Operation Deny Flight in Bosnia and Operation Allied 
Force in Kosovo.13 Turkey’s contribution to the NATO International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) includes leading both ISAF Command Headquarters and Kabul Regional 
Command on multiple occasions and consistently maintaining its status as one of the 
major troop contributing nations since 2003.14  Most recently, Turkey agreed on the 
                                                 
12 European Union, EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World, April 26, 2013. 
13 Ali Karaosmanoglu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey.” 
Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (2000): 211. 
14 Janes Sentinel Security Assessment—Eastern Mediterranean. 18; Afghanistan ISAF, Accessed 
March 12, 2013, http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php. 
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construction of an AN/TPY-2 ballistic missile defense radar site in its eastern region as 
part of the U.S. led European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) defense network.  
The post-Cold War development of the European Community’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), formerly the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), 
served to adulterate Turkey’s influence over European security issues.15 However, 
Ankara demonstrated its ability to influence European security policy by creating 
obstacles to EU-NATO cooperation and institution building. Grounded primarily in fears 
that the EU, as a military contingent, could intervene against Turkey vis á vis Cyprus, 
Ankara demanded a mechanism ensuring Turkey’s role in European decision making on 
Cyprus related issues. The 2001 Ankara Document, developed by Turkey in coordination 
with the U.S. and UK, established that no EU-led operations shall be conducted against 
NATO allies which are not members of the EU.16  
Turkey’s security and economic interest are clearly oriented Westward despite the 
appearance of superficial Islamist accoutrements under the AKP. The current stalemate 
reference Turkey’s EU accession does not negate the importance of Turkey to Europe in 
both the economic and security realms. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
In the past, Turkey followed a cautious foreign policy approach in an effort to 
ensure “zero problems with neighbors.” International affairs analysts Igor Torbakov and 
Hanna Ojanen correctly state, “The Turkey that Europe and America are likely to deal 
with in the foreseeable future is a different kind of geopolitical animal—one that the 
Western allies appear to find difficult to get used to.”17 After the AKP’s 2011 landslide 
election victory, third term Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proclaimed: “The 
                                                 
15 European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy Accessed February 7, 2013, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm.  
16 Şebnem Udum, “Turkey’s Role in Post-Cold War European Security Policy,” in European Security 
in Transition, ed. Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 165. 
17 Igor Torbakov and Hanna Ojanen, “Looking for a New Strategic Identity: Is Turkey Emerging as an 
Independent Regional Power?,” Finnish Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper, May 2009, 7. 
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Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans have won as much as Turkey.”18 Erdoğan’s 
words signaled a shift in focus and an increase in foreign policy activity by the Turkish 
government. Turkey’s military power and soft power (economic, cultural and historical 
linkages, and diplomacy) within the regions it borders vary, but the potential for 
increased Turkish influence is favorable. According to the Futures Power Index, Turkey 
will compete with Saudi Arabia and Iran for influence in the Middle East in the years to 
come.19  
This study surmises the AKP’s foreign policies and strategy in the South 
Caucasus and the Levant creates both obstacles and opportunities for the EU and NATO. 
After years of cautious foreign policy predicated on maintaining amicable relations with 
its neighbors and working within the NATO construct, Turkey gradually increased its 
level of unilateral regional engagement. Turkey’s geostrategic calculations are shaped by 
years of European Imperial influence and intrigue, and competition with what was once 
Turkey’s traditional adversary—Russia. At the forefront of Turkey-Russia relations are 
overlapping interest in the South Caucasus and Black Sea region. The objectives of 
Ankara’s policy in the South Caucasus include maintaining regional stability, increasing 
trade, and avoiding friction with Russia. Turkey’s foreign policy approach entails 
balancing its ties to NATO and the U.S. with gradual rapprochement with Moscow. The 
U.S.-Russia relationship places Turkey in a delicate position as it attempts to meet U.S.-
NATO obligations and assuage Russian geopolitical demands. The 2008 Georgia-Russia 
conflict compelled Turkey to respond to instability in its backyard. Parallel to French 
president Nicolas Sarkozy’s efforts to end the conflict in his role as EU president, Ankara 
conducted its own diplomatic effort to end the Russia-Georgia conflict. On the night of 
11 August 2008, Erdogan and his Foreign Policy Minister Ali Babacan met with Russia’s 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitri Medvedev, and Foreign Minister Sergey 
                                                 
18Sussane Güsten, “Mandate for a New Turkish Era,” New York Times, June 15, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/world/europe/16iht-M16-TURKEY-
POLICY.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
19 “The International Futures Modeling System Version 6.69,” University of Denver, 2013, 
http://www.ifs.du.edu/ifs/index.aspx. 
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V. Lavrov and “urged them to cease hostilities and certainly not march on Tbilisi.”20 
Some western countries interpret Ankara’s unilateralism as further proof of Turkey’s 
gradual movement away from NATO and the West. Turkey’s location on the volatile 
East-West corridor and Ankara’s perceived oscillation between the West, Russia, and the 
East creates a complex convergence of foreign policy issues and relationships. Turkey 
heavily depends on Russia for natural gas and trade.21  Economic leverage applied by 
Russia potentially impacts Turkey’s stance on EU, NATO, U.S., and UN issues. Events 
just after the Russian invasion of Georgia exemplify the potential for Russian coercion. 
U.S. Navy vessels supporting NATO Operation Active Endeavor attempted to enter the 
Black Sea with humanitarian aid for war-torn Georgia; Russia pressured Turkey to not let 
the vessels through the Bosporus straits.22  
Turkey’s foreign policy movements in the Middle East are also transforming the 
geostrategic landscape. Rapprochement between Turkey and Iran is a potential problem. 
Turkey maintains a relationship with Iran despite international condemnation of Tehran’s 
suspected nuclear weapons program. Related to the Iran question is Turkey’s lukewarm 
relationship with Tehran’s nemesis— Israel. Ankara’s poor relationship with Tel-Aviv 
over the last few years complicates the Palestinian question. Turkish PM Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan is cultivating a relationship with Hamas that in the long-term potentially 
supports the peace process and the efforts of the Quartet (the EU, UN, U.S., and Russia) 
or hampers diplomatic efforts for an amicable settlement.  
The Turkish governments growing tendency to dilute democratic principles and 
secularist ideas and increasingly support Islamist ideology within government institutions 
is a source of tension between the West and Ankara. Furthermore, burgeoned by a vibrant 
economy, Turkey is taking steps to increase its profile within the South Caucasus, and 
Middle East. Turkish Foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s publication Alternative 
                                                 
20Bulent Aliriza, Edward C. Chow, Andrew C. Kuchins, Haim Malka, and Julianne Smith, Turkey’s 
Evolving Dynamics: Strategic Choices for US Turkey Relations, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, March 2009), 62.  
21 Alexander Ghaleb, “Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power,” The Letort Papers-
Strategic Studies Institute, 2011, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/. 
22 Bulent Aliriza et al., “Turkey’s Evolving,” 66;  
 9
Paradigms: The Impact of Islam and Western Weltanschauung on Political Theory in 
1993 suggest political Islam is incompatible with Western democratic political 
traditions.23 Further evidence suggests non-democratic practices are creeping into 
domestic policies (e.g., suppression of the free press). Ankara’s past policies were 
informed by its ongoing struggle for EU membership; empirical evidence and rhetoric 
emanating from EU member-states such as France suggests Turkish membership is not 
on the horizon. Both the EU’s rebuff of Turkish membership and Turkey’s economic 
success play an important role in Ankara’s unilateralism and the perception of an 
Eastward shift. In the past the Turkish military traditionally held sway in the political 
realm as the keeper of modern Turkey’s Kemalist traditions. The Turkish military took 
steps to increase Turkey’s chances for EU membership by allowing itself to be subsumed 
by civilian authority. Ironically, the military’s efforts led indirectly to conditions that 
allowed for the arrest of hundreds of senior military leaders and the emergence of a 
political party which does not strongly embrace Kemalism. 
Turkey’s newfound foreign policy approach is potentially problematic for NATO 
and the EU. Energy security is a problem voiced by both NATO in its 2010 Strategic 
Concept and by the EU in the 2003 European Security Strategy and a 2011 background 
report on energy in Europe prepared for the EU Council.24 Europe’s natural gas and oil 
needs are predicted to remain somewhere near current demand levels but heavy 
dependence on one primary source and the increasing consumption of emerging 
economies creates energy concerns and downstream impacts on other commodities and 
industry.25 Turkey-EU cooperation (or lack of cooperation) in the energy sector portends 
far reaching implications for Europe and exporters in the Caspian Basin. If Russian  
 
                                                 
23 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Waltanschauungs on 
Political Theory (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993), 2. 
24 North Atlatic Treaty Organization, Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2010, http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-
eng.pdf, 17; European Union, EU Security Strategy, December 12, 2003, http://consilium.europa.eu/, 3. 




leverage in the region is not balanced Caspian fuel potentially transits through Russian 
versus Turkey further entrenching Europe’s and the Caspian state’s dependence on 
Moscow. 
The activist foreign policy implemented by Turkey’s ruling Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) is viewed warily by NATO and 
the EU. Since joining NATO in 1952, Turkey has played the role of both pivotal ally and 
conflicted unilateralist; Turkey’s emergence as a unilateral actor adds an additional layer 
of complexity to its relationship with the U.S. and NATO.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature and strategic documents related to Turkey’s foreign policy 
movements and national interest, geopolitical issues in the South Caucasus and the 
Middle East, and NATO and EU strategic objectives within these regions are readily 
available. However, information dedicated to analysis of Turkish foreign policy and 
interest and its implications for NATO and the EU is not as prevalent. Documents touch 
on the relationship of the three but a gap exists concerning an assessment and comparison 
of the overlapping interest of Turkey and those of the European entities within the South 
Caucasus, and Middle East. 
Several books and documents analyze the origin of Turkey’s strategic culture, 
foreign policy, and relationship with its neighbors. The historical legacy of Turkish 
secularist ideology espoused by Mustafa Kemal (later “Ataturk’) is covered in much of 
the literature and is used to explain Turkey’s unique position in both the Muslim and 
Western world. Turkey at the Crossroads and Turkey: A Modern History for example 
details the origins of Kemalism, its linkage to the Ottoman Tanzimat era, and how the 
military emerged as the keepers of Turkey’s secularist tradition.26 The authors, of Turkey 
at the Crossroads Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, for instance, detail the rise of 
political Islam in Turkey in relation to the political nature of the military, an important 
element in understanding the AKP. The authors point to several instances where 
                                                 
26 Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads (London: Zed Books, 2001); Erik J. 
Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004). 
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diplomatic conflict with the West caused Turkish rapprochement with the Arab world 
(1962–63 withdrawal of US Jupiter Missile from Turkey and 1964 Cyprus issue) and 
examples where Islamist Prime Ministers, such as Necmettin Erbakan, promised Turkish 
withdrawal from both NATO and the EU Customs Union but then disregarded the threats 
in light of Turkey’s national interest.27  This historical treatment of Turkey lays the 
groundwork for understanding Turkish foreign policy and its relationship with its 
neighbors within an EU-NATO context. 
Turkey’s relationship with the West and its more active role in its neighborhood 
spark much of the interests in Ankara’s foreign policy. Several sources offer  
explanations for why Turkey’s foreign policy changed since the end of the cold war are 
explored; the loss of the Soviet threat; impact of U.S.-led wars in Muslim-majority lands; 
the impact of the EU accession process; economic success; the changing power structure 
in the Middle East; and the Islamist nature of the current Turkish leadership. Much of the 
literature concludes despite the international political leverage loss by Turkey after the 
Cold War, the multi-dimensional instability created by the post-Cold War era brings 
Turkey’s importance and impact on the West to the forefront of regional policy issues.  
Three books, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, Turkey’s Foreign 
Policy in the 21st Century, and Turkey and Its Neighbors: Foreign Relations in Transition 
synthesize similar factors affecting Turkish geopolitical activities and its relationship 
with the EU and NATO.28 Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century touches on the 
political aspects of the EU security apparatus in relation to Turkey but does not cover 
overlapping regional strategies and interest.  Turkey and Its Neighbors briefly addresses 
the implications of Turkey’s policies in the Middle East for the EU. Turkish Foreign 
Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, similar to Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century 
analyzes the political aspects of EU accession and additionally discusses NATO within 
                                                 
27 Jung and Piccoli, Turkey, 132. 
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the context of the Turkey-U.S. relationship. While the three books, take a social and 
historical approach in analyzing recent Turkish foreign relations and policies, the political 
treatise written by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s foreign minister, provides an 
understanding of the political theory underpinning Turkish foreign policies, relationships, 
and decision calculus. In Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western 
Weltanschauungs on Political Theory, Davutoğlu proclaims, “Islam is conceived as an 
alternate Weltanschauung to the Western philosophico-political tradition,” and moreover, 
the Foreign Minister believes “the efficiency of rationality of the political mechanism is a 
secondary and dependent variable” to Islamic values which are solidified through the 
“Muslim historical experience.”29 Although published in 1994, the words of Davutoğlu 
resonate in both Turkish domestic and foreign policy. The U.S. Congress Committee on 
Foreign Relations report, titled Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Direction: Implications for 
U.S.-Turkish Relations, provides varied expert opinions on the AKP which help in 
extrapolating Ankara’s foreign policy direction and the long-term implications for the 
West. Ian Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow for the German Marshall Fund, believes 
Turkey’s new foreign policy direction is “durable” and reflects shifts in public opinion.30 
Conversely, Soner Cagaptay believes the Islamist lens through which the AKP sees the 
world shapes the Turkish public’s perspective on international issues.31 In essence, both 
foresee continued AKP foreign policies and approaches to international issues that differ 
from the West.  
NATO and EU documents provide the basis for analyzing EU-NATO versus 
Turkish interest and policies in the South Caucasus and the Middle East.  The European 
Security Strategy (ESS), CFSP, and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), are 
the EU’s foundational security documents. Missions conducted under the CSDP are both 
military and civilian in nature and cover Europe, Eurasia, Africa, and the Middle East. 
Past and present examples include; EU Force Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU Rule 
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of Law Mission in Kosovo, EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL 
COPPS), and EU Police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan).32 Issues 
important to the EU include weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, illegal 
trafficking, counterterrorism, engagement with Russia, and energy security. The EU 
documents demonstrate the overlay of regional interest between the EU and Turkey and 
the potential for cooperation or interference between Brussels and Ankara. The security 
interest defined in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept mirror those of the EU but also 
places emphasis on missile defense and security in Central Asia (important for ISAF and 
Afghanistan). The Lisbon and Chicago summits reiterate much of the requirements found 
in the strategic concept. 
Scholarly literature, U.S. government reports, and various EU and NATO 
strategic documents provide a great deal of data and analysis concerning EU-Turkey 
relations and Ankara’s policy direction; however, analysis of overlapping Turkish and 
EU-NATO regional policies and interests is not widely available. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES  
Turkish foreign policy provides difficulties, layers of complexity, and 
opportunities for NATO and the EU. The degree to which Turkish policies interact 
positively or negatively with NATO and EU policies is probabilistic. Empirical examples 
are used to link Ankara’s policies and actions to implications for the EU and NATO. The 
required antecedent conditions and variables are also analyzed and used to strengthen 
causal relationships. Additionally, by knotting EU-NATO and Ankara interest, inferences 
or propositions for the continued relationship between the European entities and Turkey 
are developed.       
Information for this thesis is provided by a variety of primary and secondary 
sources. Numerous scholarly books and journals, U.S., European, and Turkish 
government documents, professional studies, and news publications provide information 
relating to past and recent events. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis begins with a look at the transitional period between the Ottoman 
Empire and modern Turkish history followed by a survey of Turkey’s strategic culture 
and security interest. The historical perspective solidifies Turkey’s social, cultural, and 
political links to the regions it borders. Similarly, the short survey of modern Turkish 
history details the prism through which Turkey views its environment and amplifies the 
importance of history and geography in shaping Ankara’s strategic culture and interest. 
The bulk of the analysis covers the last 10 years of the AKP-led government. Then 
looking ahead, comparisons are made between the objectives and interest of NATO and 
the EU versus those of Turkey as a means to discern future congruencies, divisions, and 
opportunities. 
Next, regional (South Caucasus and the Levant) strategic net assessment serves as 
the basis for determining where EU-NATO and Turkish policy interest overlap, and the 
challenges and opportunities presented by mutual regional interest. In the Middle East the 
Arab Spring fostered instability and violent uprisings in countries such as Egypt and 
Syria. In the South Caucasus, frozen conflicts, large energy reserves, and Russian 
influence converge to create strategic opportunities and security concerns. 
The conclusion, based on analysis of EU-NATO and Turkish geopolitical policies 
and interest, will assess the potential for cooperation and obstruction in various areas of 
common concern such as regional diplomacy, energy security, and crisis management. 
The purpose is to draw implications for EU and NATO policy and strategy in three 
important regions. 
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II. TURKEY AND EUROPE: THE PAST AS PRELUDE 
During a 2011 Carnegie Europe speech, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen declared: “Throughout history, the fates of Europe and North Africa, and the 
wider Middle East have been linked. Our economies are linked. Our people are linked. 
And our security is linked.”33 This chapter links Turkey to Europe through the means of a 
common European-Turkish history and the military and economic linkages that are 
central to this story. The relationship between Turkey and Europe is not exclusively a 
product of the Bretton-Woods or Cold-War eras; it is a continuation of common politico-
economic and geostrategic strains and interest that manifested during the late Ottoman 
period and before that is, from the eighteenth century until 1914. Turkey’s importance to 
Europe and vice versa, and modern Turkey’s Weltanschauung, is forged in the age of 
rivalries between the great European empires and their downfall in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Indeed, Mustafa Kemal’s westward looking agenda and the AKP’s 
moderate Islamist efforts to straddle the fence linking the west to the east are in essence 
the amalgamation and realization of the modernization efforts of Sultan Selim III (ruled 
1789–1807) and Sultan Mahmut II (ruled 1808–1839). Similar to the sultans, Mustafa 
Kemal’s movement modernized and attempted to socially engineer Turkey under 
enlightened authoritarian rule. Additionally, modern Turkey’s Cold War and post-Cold 
War period relationships, interest, and policies within the European context, similar to the 
Ottoman era, are informed by politico-military alliances (NATO) and attempts at 
economic integration (EU). 
The transformation and westernization of Turkish institutions began in 1792 as 
Ottoman Sultan Selim III, and later Mahmut II, attempted to centralize power under the 
sultan.34 As a prince, Selim III corresponded with French King Louis XVI and 
maintained a circle of friends who enjoyed elements of the diverse European cultures.35 
                                                 
33 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO and the Arab Spring Speech by NATO Secretary 
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35 Ibid., 21. 
 16
Transformation began with the Ottoman military transformation (Nizam-I Cedid). French 
military and administrative advisors of the ancien régime and later of the republic and 
Napoleonic Empire attempted to transform Ottoman forces to the European model.36 
Socialization and interaction with the French soldiers and bureaucrats brought new ideas 
and ways of thinking to the Empire.37 Selim III’s efforts failed, but laid the foundation 
for Mahmut II’s successful effort to obliterate the political and social power of the jeni 
çeri (salaried infantry) and to a lesser extent that of the Ulema (doctors of Islamic law).38 
The resulting administrative, economic, educational, and legal structures served to further 
the Empires European integration and subjugate (not separate) religion to the political. 
Importantly, the Tanzimat, period of Ottoman transformation between 1839 and 1871, 
ultimately sought to develop within the Empire European-style enablers of power such as 
professional and educated government officials and effective government bureaucracies 
to manage the Sultanate and collects taxes for the development of economic power and a 
modern Ottoman army.39 The reformers believed a strong army potentially placed the 
Empire on equal diplomatic and political footing with the great powers and deterred 
European intrigue and territorial ambition; westernization was not meant to be a social or 
cultural engineering project. Similar themes concerning political economies and power 
balancing permeate Turkey’s post-World War II western integration, a distinction from 
the Tanzimat era’s westernization.  
It is important to understand the underlying strategic and social context that drives 
the long-standing relationship between Europe and Turkey. The lands under the Ottoman 
domain were vitally important to the conflicting empires of Europe in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries; the Dardanelles, for example, were a key maritime link between 
both the Mediterranean and Black Sea and the European and Asian continents. The 
immense British Empire, in conflict with the Ramanov’s in the fate of central Asia in the 
19th century, stretched to East Asia. The land routes and sea lanes linking the empire were 
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vulnerable to interdiction from other European nations but especially from Russia with 
whom the British were on bad terms after 1852 and the Crimean War. The passages to 
India were of particular concern to the English government. The British feared a Russian 
invasion of India through Afghanistan and foreign influence over the geo-strategically 
important sea and land routes within the Ottoman Empire. The sea lanes linking the 
Black Sea to the Mediterranean were particularly important to Britain and Russia. 
Control or access to the North-South passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean 
would give Russia access to warm water ports and provide a means to interdict British 
interest in the Mediterranean if necessary.40 An Ottoman Empire dominated by Russian 
influence posed an existential threat to the British Empire as well as the whole European 
state system in the second half of the nineteenth century. The English therefore developed 
its foreign policy to counter Russia’s, and any other adversaries, designs in the region. 
The cornerstone of the plan required Britain maintain close ties to the Ottoman central 
government and take measures to strengthen the government from collapse or undue 
influence from other nations. Conversely, today, Russia is concerned about foreign 
military access to the Dardanelles and the Black Sea area and demonstrated during the 
2008 Russia-Georgia a willingness to pressure Turkey into politically obstructing foreign 
(non-Black Sea littoral states) military access to the Black Sea.41 
Other European powers heavily engaged with the Ottoman Empire in the 
nineteenth century included France, Austro-Hungary, and in later years, the German 
Reich. French involvement in the Eastern question stemmed initially from its power 
rivalry with Britain. Alliances and interest changed frequently during the period of 
empires and so did France’s goals which ranged from economic to territorial gain after 
the Crimean War when conflict with the British attenuated. Austria had similar concerns 
as the British and sought to deny Russia control over the Balkan region located on the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire’s eastern flank especially in the epoch in which Austria was 
driven from Germany itself and northern Italy in the mid-nineteenth century, its interest 
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in the Balkans intensified. A unified Germany was driven by similar interest as France 
and the need to uphold its alliance system with the Russians and Austrian to preserve 
order in Europe, and from the early twentieth century, Germany sought its own sphere of 
influence in the eastern Mediterranean areas of the Ottoman Empire.42 In the early 
nineteen hundreds German investments in the Ottoman Empire surged from one percent 
to twenty-five percent.43 The European imperial powers challenged each other and the 
authority and hegemony of the Ottoman Empire. Such rivalry ended in brutal conflict 
between the years 1914 and 1918, when war engulfed the region with the Turks allied 
with Germany and Austria—the Central Powers. The defeat of the Central Powers 
facilitated British, French, and to a lesser degree, Red Russian dominance of former 
Ottoman lands. The ill-conceived statecraft and division of the Ottoman Empire 
engendered an instability that plagues the Middle East into the present. 
Turkey’s post-World War II relationship with Europe has been manifested 
through institutional ties with NATO and a more or less tepid relationship with the 
predecessor organizations of the EU, and since the 1990s with the EU itself. Turkey’s 
relationship with the NATO is informed heavily by geography, Turkey’s control of the 
Dardanelles for instance. Coinciding with the Greek civil war (1946–1949), which pitted 
pro-western forces against communist, President Harry S. Truman, in March 1947, 
introduced a doctrine for containing Soviet expansion. The Truman Doctrine’s core 
concept, derived from the so-called domino theory, involved supporting diplomatically, 
economically, and militarily those countries vulnerable to communist threats (especially 
in southern Europe). Due primarily to its own economic hardship, Britain announced it 
could no longer provide aid to Greece and Turkey; the U.S. under the tenants of the 
Truman Doctrine now took on the role that thrust it more deeply in to the fate of the 
Balkans and Europe generally.44  
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44 U.S. Congress, President Truman’s Message to Congress; March 12, 1947, Document 171, 80th 
Congress, 1st Session (Records of the United States House of Representatives), 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=81. 
 19
Cold War realities and economic necessity compelled Turkey’s decision to pursue 
NATO membership after 1949. In 1945 and 1946 Joseph Stalin made Soviet intentions of 
southward expansion clear; contradicting Montreux Convention mandates, the Soviet 
leader demanded Turkey agree to joint Turkish-Soviet defense of the Bosporus and 
Dardanelles Straits, and also made territorial claims on the Turkish provinces of Kars and 
Ardahan.45  Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes understood a foreign policy step 
such as NATO membership reached outside the bounds of Kemalist thought; however, 
the Soviet Union’s designs on Turkish territory heavily influenced the prime ministers 
decision. Turkey orchestrated its western alignment through major diplomatic moves. 
Key actions included recognizing Israel in 1949 and sending troops to fight in Korea in 
1950 under a United Nations mandate. The Turkish brigade composed of 4,500 soldiers, 
received high praise from U.S. leaders and most NATO member-states of the era; by the 
wars end in 1953, approximately 25,000 Turkish soldiers had fought on the Korean 
peninsula suffering heavy casualties.46 In view of this sacrifice and the urgent 
requirement to solidify the defense of Europe’s southern flank, the North Atlantic 
Council deputies issued a secret memorandum on 17 October 1951 recommending 
membership for both Turkey and Greece, but consensus among the alliance was not yet 
reached.47 NATO members Denmark and Norway stymied membership for both Turkey 
and Greece arguing the countries were “neither Atlantic nor democratic;” however, 
consensus was eventually reached and Turkey (and Greece) joined NATO on 18 
February 1952.48  
Turkey believed NATO membership would lead to the closer affiliation with the 
institutions of Europe; the final step in solidifying Turkey’s Western credentials. In 1948 
Turkey joined the European Economic Cooperation (EEC) organization, succeeded later 
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, as a founding 
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member.49 Indeed, Turkey joined the Council of Europe in 1949 further signaling 
Ankara’s desire for a western identity. The 1963 Ankara Association Agreement and the 
planned Customs Union between Turkey and European Common Market laid the 
foundation for Turkey’s economic growth and portended Turkey’s eventual EU accession 
process.50  
Trade disputes and political conflict between Turkey and the EEC strained 
relations in the late 1970s and 80s; fractures occurred in the EEC-Ankara relationship 
following the 1980 military coup d’état led by Turkish General Kenan Evren. The 
Turkish army dissolved the parliament and jailed its leaders; trade unions and political 
groups disbanded under military pressure.51 Consequently, the EEC cut relations with the 
military junta.52 After a rapprochement period Turkey applied for EEC membership 
1987. Following two years of deliberation, the EEC rejected Turkish membership citing 
internal EEC institutional vulnerabilities; Ankara’s shortfalls in political reform; and 
social and economic development “gaps” between the EEC countries and Turkey.53 In 
1999, the EU granted Turkey candidate status.54 
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III. SOUTH CAUCASUS REGIONAL ASSESSMENT  
A. TURKEY, EU-NATO, AND RUSSIA’S NEAR-ABROAD 
The Caucasus signifies a region of crisis where cultural, religious, political, and 
ethnic ties have smoldered throughout for more than a century. Challenges to stability 
and order abound: inter-ethnic conflict, corruption, transnational crime, internally 
displaced persons, and economic depression are persistent problems. Turkey, the EU, 
NATO, the U.S., Iran, and the Russian Federation all have an interest in this region, but 
the power, influence, and degree of assertiveness of each state and regional entity varies. 
Ankara’s interest and policies in the South Caucasus mesh with EU-NATO regional 
interest and objectives such as securing alternate energy sources and ensuring regional 
security and stability; however Turkey’s policy movements are heavily influence by 
regional actors. 
Turkey’s policies in the Caucasus changed from near to no interaction during the 
Soviet-era to a very active approach after the Soviet collapse in 1991. Interestingly, 
before most other nations, Turkey recognized the Republics of Armenia, Georgia, and 
Azerbaijan.55 Ankara, similar to the EU and NATO, attempts to forward its regional 
political interest without upsetting the geostrategic balance with Moscow. Turkey seeks 
regional stability and good Ankara-Moscow relations, but unlike the EU and NATO 
evidence suggests the AKP prioritizes stability over regional democratic reforms. Turkey, 
for example, similar to Russia, did not support the democratic 2003 Rose Revolution in 
Georgia.56 The AKP’s good-neighborhood policy seeks to increase Ankara’s profile as a 
regional inoculator and problem solver, but Turkey’s current foreign policy approach 
potentially generates miscommunication between Ankara and Brussels.  For instance, 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s action during the 2008 Georgia-Russian conflict 
is emblematic of Ankara’s willingness to unilaterally conduct regional diplomacy. 
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Paralleling similar objectives of EU President Nicolas Sarkozy’s mediation effort in the 
region, Erdoğan flew to Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan proposing a regional dialogue 
and stability pact through the Ankara-developed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation 
Platform.57 Turkish influence throughout the region is viewed cautiously by both Russia 
and Iran, but it is regarded positively by the EU, NATO, and the U.S. despite Ankara’s 
unilateralism.  
1. Historical and Contemporary Context: “Frozen Conflicts” And 
Caspian Energy 
An understanding of the current conflicts, tensions, and interest of the EU, 
NATO, and Turkey in the South Caucasus requires some reflection on Europe and 
Turkey’s past exploits in the region. Prominent on both Europe and Turkey’s South 
Caucasus agenda is the instability engendered by so-called “frozen conflicts” and the 
opportunities for energy diversification presented by Caspian region gas fields. 
Dating back to the early 1800’s, the Ottoman, Russian, and Western European 
empires, maintained an ongoing rivalry in the region. Ethnic separatism and conflict is 
not a recent geopolitical phenomenon in the Caucasus. In 1905, for example, the Azeris 
and Armenian Dashnaktsutyun grappled for Nagorno-Karabakh; during this period riots 
erupted in Baku and the Shusha region of Western Karabakh resulting in thousands of 
deaths.58 The great power struggle for influence and territory in the  Anglo Russian 
Ottoman and German “Great Game” continued in the last months and immediately after 
World War I as the newly established Azeri Democratic Republic supported by the 
Ottomans suppressed ethnic Armenian separatist and ejected British forces from Baku.59  
The German’s sought to gain control of the Baku oil fields but the interests of its 
Ottoman ally derailed the effort.60 The Ottomans (and the remaining Central Powers), 
facing military defeat on multiple fronts, signed the Mudros armistice with the Entente 
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powers on 31 October 1918.61 The Red Army reestablished Russian control of 
Transcaucasia (South Caucasus) in 1921 and signed the Treaty of Friendship (also known 
as the Treaty of Moscow) with Turkish nationalist who were fighting for their own 
independence. In exchange for gold and military supplies Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist 
movement ceded Nachicevan and Batum provinces to the Bolsheviks.62  
In the last two decades, Soviet communism’s left a void soon filled by 
nationalism, ethno-cultural rivalries, and separatist conflicts. The 1988 to 1994 Armenia-
Azerbaijan war resulted in Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and the end 
of official relations between Armenia and the Azerbaijani-Turkish pact. Ankara 
eschewed military support to Azerbaijan during the conflict as a deterrent to NATO and 
Russian military intervention.63 Turkey, however, in 1993 demonstrated its support for 
Azerbaijan’s position by closing the Turkey-Armenia border crossings and cutting off 
trade with Armenia. In 2008 Russian and Georgia fought for control of the region South 
Ossetia. The so-called “frozen conflicts” between Armenia and Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and Georgia and the Russian over South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
threaten both European and Turkish interest. 
The discovery of gas deposits in Azerbaijan and Central Asia (gas which most 
likely will flow to Europe via Azerbaijan) has added another dimension to the economic, 
geostrategic, and geopolitical complexity in the South Caucasus. Moscow’s attempts to 
gain access to and control over Caspian energy routes potentially leads to further 
European and Turkish reliance on Russian energy. Russia’s monopoly on European and 
Turkish oil and gas markets and energy infrastructure and Moscow’s willingness to use 
energy as a political tool creates trepidation in both Ankara and Brussels. Most recently 
Moscow promised Kiev and Moldova reduced gas prices as enticement to join the 
Russian Customs Union.64 Russia cut energy supplies to Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
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Czech Republic, Belarus, and Moldova over the past eleven years further demonstrating 
Moscow’s willingness to use energy as a political instrument.65  
Both Turkey and Europe are vulnerable to energy coercion and disruption by its 
hydrocarbon suppliers. The 2009 European gas supply disruptions and events during the 
2008 Georgia-Russia war showcase Europe and Turkey’s vulnerabilities and the strategic 
implications. Disagreements between Russian energy giant Gazprom and Ukrainian 
national oil and gas company Naftogaz resulted in disruption of Russian gas in route to 
Central and Western Europe and consequently exposed the EU and NATO’s vulnerability 
to coercive energy politics. Severe gas shortages in both large and small EU and NATO 
member-states forced gas rationing by energy firms; sub-zero temperatures exacerbated 
the crisis causing many European countries to draw heavily on gas reserves.66  Turkey 
imports roughly 60 percent of its natural gas from Russia.67  Events just after the Russian 
invasion of Georgia exemplify the potential for Russian coercion. U.S. Navy vessels 
supporting NATO Operation Active Endeavor attempted to enter the Black Sea with 
humanitarian aid for war-torn Georgia; Russia pressured Turkey to not let the vessels 
through the straits under the mandates of the Montreux Convention. Russian customs 
officials delayed Turkish commercial truck shipments at the Russian border resulting in 
Turkey losing more than $1 billion in lost revenue.68 Erdoğan thought of retaliation but 
quickly realized “we would be left in the dark” if Moscow so desired.69 Most recently, 
Turkey’s decision to support NATO radar sites near the city of Malatya resulted in 
Moscow’s suspending talks on the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline. A project championed by 
Ankara to link Turkey’s Black Sea and Mediterranean coast by pipeline as a means to 
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relieve traffic in the Bosporus Straits created by tankers carrying Russian and Kazakh 
oil.70  
Strains of past themes and narratives emanate throughout present day EU-NATO 
and Turkish interactions in the South Caucasus. The interplay of Russia, energy, and the 
dormant but smoldering regional conflicts informs the continuing cooperation and 
dissonance between Turkey and European security and economic institutions. 
2. Turkish and EU-NATO Regional Interest and Policies 
The AKP’s multi-vectored and occasionally schizophrenic regional policy is 
influenced by its relationship with Russia and Azerbaijan, and Turkey’s growing energy 
demands and economic expansion goals. For instance, despite Ankara’s stated objective 
to diversify energy sources, the AKP met with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
and agreed to proposals for the South Stream and Blue Stream II gas pipelines only 
weeks after signing the deal for the Caspian-based Nabucco pipeline, the Moscow 
supported pipelines defeat Turkey and EU-NATO energy diversification objectives.71 
Turkey’s so-called “rhythmic diplomacy” is defined by proactive diplomatic effort and 
engagement but is susceptible to incoherency and contradictory approaches.  
Regional socioeconomic development is an important component of the AKP’s 
good-neighbor policy. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), 
manages Turkey’s foreign aid and development policy and funding initiatives and 
provides Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs an unobtrusive soft-power tool. The 
agency’s 2011 development and assistance portfolio totaled roughly $2.3 million 
disbursed to both governmental and non-governmental aid and development 
organizations.72 Much of the aid in the South Caucasus goes to Azerbaijan, which 
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received roughly $25.5 million in 2011.73 The TIKA projects compliment the EU and 
NATO demands for socioeconomic development, democratic governance, and 
modernization in the South Caucasus. Importantly, Turkish official development 
assistance (ODA) contains a political component, and though Ankara’s humanitarian and 
developmental aid efforts compliment EU and NATO regional objectives, the ultimate 
goal is the expansion of Turkish regional influence.  
Historical relationships and political and economic interest inform the AKP’s 
distinct policies towards the three South Caucasus states. Linguistic and cultural linkages 
between Turkey and Azerbaijan create a natural bond between the two countries. 
Turkey’s military academies train hundreds of Azeri officers each year, and Turkey’s 
defense experts advise and assist Azerbaijan in defense sector reforms and military 
modernization.74 Turkeys support for Azerbaijan in its war and ensuing territorial dispute 
with Armenia is manifested through the closed Turkish-Armenian border and Ankara’s 
ongoing trade embargo against Armenia. Common economic and political interest and 
ethno-cultural linkages foster Ankara and Baku’s complementary regional policies. 
Erdogan understands that rapprochement with Armenia represents an important step in 
reinvigorating the dialogue on EU accession, but Ankara’s overtures to Yerevan without 
commensurate Armenian concession on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem creates friction 
between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In 2009 Erdogan spoke before Azerbaijan’s parliament 
to reassure Baku that Ankara’s rapprochement process required a satisfactory Karabakh 
solution prior to opening the Armenian-Turkish border.75 Most recently, Turkey’s 
transport ministry approved air flights from Van in Eastern Turkey to and the Armenian 
capital Yerevan beginning April 2013, but after strong Azeri opposition Ankara canceled 
the plan.76 
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The relationship between the two countries extends to energy development. In 
2011, Turkish business investment in Azerbaijan equaled roughly 6.5 billion U.S. dollars; 
Azerbaijan investment in Turkey measured half that amount but is steadily increasing.77 
In March 2013, Baku signed a high-profile agreement to invest in Turkey’s industrial 
infrastructure. Danish shipping and energy group Moeller-Maersk and Azerbaijan’s State 
Oil Company (SOCAR) agreed to build a modern petrochemical, container, and general 
cargo mega-port Aegean Gateway Terminal (AGT) near Izmir.78 Likewise, SOCAR’s 
Power and Energy division built a 612 megawatt electrical power-plant in Turkey and is 
in the process of laying pipe for the Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline; these investments total 
between 16 and 18 billion dollars.79 Additionally, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway 
(trial runs are scheduled for mid-2014) is heavily financed by Azerbaijan.80 The BTK 
line is expected to transport passengers, finished and raw goods, and oil between 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.81 The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe views the BTK rail line as a significant addition to the South Caucasus economic 
infrastructure and a potential link between Central Europe and Central Asia.82   
Turkey’s approach to Armenia is a product of past relationships, conflict, and 
Ankara’s regional stability and security objectives. The AKP continues the  policy 
demands of past administrations vis-à-vis Armenia, among them: put an end to claims 
that Turkey perpetrated genocide against ethnic Armenians in 1915, recognition of 
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Turkey’s border mandated in the 1921 Treaty of Kars, and find an acceptable outcome to 
the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute with Azerbaijan.83  Following the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict both Baku and Ankara severed ties with Yerevan. The closed border between 
Armenia and Turkey severely constrains Armenian economic integration and 
development. For instance, both the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the BTK 
railway bypass Armenian territory further limiting the country’s economic opportunities. 
Consequently, Yerevan re-opened the archaic and dilapidated Metasamor nuclear power 
plant to compensate for national energy shortages. Turkey and Armenia’s attempts to 
establish a diplomatic relationship under the mandate of the 2009 Zurich protocols failed 
due to numerous reasons: the interplay of third-party (i.e., U.S. and EU) interpretations of 
the events of 1915, Azerbaijan public and government pressure on Turkey, the role of the 
Armenian diaspora in shaping worldwide opinion, and Turkey’s domestic politics and 
public pressure. Importantly, Turkey’s (and Azerbaijan’s) Armenia policies drive 
Yerevan’s deepening relationship with both Russia and Iran. 
Georgia’s location on the east-west energy corridor and the north-south trade 
route to Russia ensures close cooperation between Tbilisi and Ankara. Moreover, 
Georgia is the fragile link between Caspian oil and gas and European markets, and 
Turkey’s major trading partner and energy supplier—Russia. The overlapping Russian 
and Turkish interest in Georgia create a delicate political balancing act between the 
former empires. In 2001 Georgia and Turkey signed three defense cooperation 
agreements, and both countries are members of the U.S. supported Caucasus Working 
Group.84 Despite the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, Turkey maintains a close bilateral 
defense cooperation relationship with Georgia.  
Turkey maintains close political linkage to Georgia’s Turkic Adjara province and 
supports the semi-autonomy position of the Adjarians. A relic of both Ottoman and 
Persian control of the region, Adjara is a potential source of territorial conflict. Indeed, in 
2004 Adjarian autocrat Aslan Abashidze refused to recognize newly elected Georgian 
president Mikhail Saakashvili. Abashidze ordered the destruction of two bridges and a 
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rail line linking Ajar to greater Georgia.85 During the crisis Turkey supported the EU 
declaration in favor of Georgia’s territorial integrity and right to constitutional authority 
over the Autonomous Republic of Adjara. 86 
Unlike Turkey, the EU and NATO are encumbered by obligations to regional 
allies and consequently maintain relatively unbiased South Caucasus policies. Similar to 
Ankara, NATO and the EU must account for Euro-Russia relations when constructing 
strategic objectives. The EU-NATO strategy demands the integration and interconnection 
of all three South Caucasian states. The EU, for example, demonstrated its support for tri-
state regional economic integration by refusing to invest in the BTK railway which 
bypasses Armenian territory.87 The EU and NATO South Caucasus interest are 
analogous; democratic and economic development, transnational security, and secure 
east-west lines of communication and energy routes. The NATO and EU policies allow 
the South Caucasus nations to take differing paths to European integration. Additionally, 
both entities work closely with the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on issues such as conflict prevention and 
resolution, and confronting emerging security threats.88 Article 20 of the 2012 NATO 
Chicago Summit Declaration declares, “NATO and the EU share common values and 
strategic interest” and highlights the importance of issues relevant to the South Caucasus, 
such as secure transportation routes for international trade and energy security.89 EU 
Security Strategy, similar to NATO’s Strategic Concept, states: “We should now take a 
stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in 
due course also be a neighboring region.”90  
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The 2011 and 2012 Council of the EU decisions concerning the South Caucasus 
and Crisis in Georgia acknowledged that the EU is delinquent in developing a 
comprehensive policy for the South Caucasus.91 In 2004 the EU created the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as a means to develop closer relationships with nations on 
the EU frontier, increase economic integration, promote democratic values, rule of law, 
and respect for human rights.92 EU Special Representatives (EUSR) work within the EU 
CFSP mandate and its supporting ENP framework to: promote EU interest; foster 
cooperation; and conduct conflict resolution within potentially unstable and fragile 
regions.93 The EU Action Plans specify the resolution of internal and external conflicts as 
priorities, but interestingly, each plan prioritizes the solution of the “frozen conflicts” 
differently: in the Azerbaijan plan “a peaceful solution in Nagorno-Karabakh” is given 
number one priority; in the Armenian plan Nagorno-Karabakh is priority number seven; 
as for the Georgia plan, the conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia rank as the 
number six priority.94 The EU attempts a comprehensive approach supporting public 
sector reform, infrastructure modernization projects, and democratic practices through the 
EU’s European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Funding from 2007 to 
2013 varies by country: Georgia received €300m; the EU allocated Armenia roughly 
€255m; and Azerbaijan €214m95. 
NATO objectives in the South Caucasus (similar to its objectives in other regions) 
complement those of the EU. NATO’s primary conduits for promoting its interest and 
executing policy objectives are the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and Individual 
Partnership Action Plans (IPAP). Established in 1994, the PfP signaled NATO’s 
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willingness to support the security needs of emerging democracies born after the 
disintegration of the Soviet system. Among the stated objectives found in the PfP 
framework document: promoting transparent defense and budget planning processes, 
ensuring civilian control of the military, and developing forces capable of operating with 
NATO during peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.96   The IPAP is the framework 
document providing detailed requirements for Euro-Atlantic integration. The 2002 
NATO Prague summit introduced and described the IPAP as a medium to “prioritise, 
harmonise, and organise all aspects of NATO-Partner relationship in the EAPC and PfP 
frameworks.”97  In this connection, each of the South Caucasus states participates in PfP 
to varying degrees and maintains an IPAP. Armenia, for instance, is closely linked to 
Russia militarily, politically, and economically and attempts to balance Western 
integration through PfP program and IPAP with its relationship to Moscow. Armenia 
hosted NATO/PfP exercise “Cooperative Best Effort” in 2003 at the Vazgen Sargsian 
Military Institute demonstrating a willingness to cooperate with the West despite 
Yerevan’s lack of interest in NATO membership. Additionally, partner interoperability 
and participation in NATO-led operations is a major component of the PfP program. 
Armenian military forces served under the NATO Kosovo Force in 2004 and most 
recently Yerevan contributed troops to the ISAF command in Afghanistan.98  
The relationship between NATO and Georgia is multidimensional and infused 
with many programs due primarily to Georgia’s fervid quest for NATO membership. 
During the 2012 Chicago Summit NATO reaffirmed its commitment to Georgia’s 
eventual membership in the Alliance and “continued support to the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of Georgia.”99 Cooperation is conducted through the NATO-Georgia 
Commission (NGC) which monitors Georgia’s implementation of the Annual National 
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Program (ANP) which defines the civilian and military reform measures and milestones 
for Tbilisi’s integration.100 Importantly, the measures required by the ANP are similar to 
those found within the NATO Membership Action Plan; however, NATO is concerned 
with regional security and the promotion of democratic principles more so than a 
roadmap to future membership.  
Azerbaijan maintains a neutral stance on NATO membership, but its leanings are 
Euro-Atlantic and it maintains an important PfP role. Baku understands close ties to 
NATO weakens its relationship with Moscow, results in greater Russian support for 
Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh question, and creates concern in Tehran.101 Similar to 
the incongruities found in the EU Action Plans for Armenia and Azerbaijan, NATO’s 
policy toward the question of Nagorno-Karabakh is murky. In the 2008 United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution vote “reaffirming the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan,” 
the United States and France voted against the measure and the UK and Germany 
abstained demonstrating a lack of consensus among NATO (and EU) member 
countries.102 
Turkish and EU-NATO policies in the South Caucasus follow similar trajectories 
and have similar objectives. The EU-NATO institutions attempt to parlay security 
arrangements in the South Caucasus as a means to stabilize Europe’s eastern frontier and 
groom the region for gas distribution to Europe. Similarly, Turkey demands energy and 
stability along its borders. Turkey’s policies in the region are heavily shaped by cultural 
ties and impassioned narratives whereas for the EU and NATO the approach is 
egalitarian in nature, arguably by virtue of the European publics relative disinterest in the 
region. 
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3. Aligned and Divergent Policies and Interest: Consequences and 
Opportunities  
There is more harmony than discord between Turkish and EU-NATO South 
Caucasus interest and policies. The primary areas of common interest are the energy 
development and regional security domains. Importantly, Europe benefits from Turkey’s 
increasing demand for energy. Turkey’s expanding economy and the corresponding 
growth in energy consumption compels Ankara to increase oil and gas storage and 
throughput capacity and modernize facilities and seaport infrastructure. Turkey’s energy 
demand is expected to increase roughly 4 percent a year through 2020.103 EU-NATO 
members such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, and EU 
member Austria (among others) depend on Russia for over 60 percent of their gas 
requirements.104 Energy source diversification enhances EU and NATO member states’ 
ability to develop policies without undue Russian influence.  
The EU and Turkey can facilitate energy access by playing active roles in 
resolving issues such as Caspian Sea delineation. The uncertain legal status of the 
Caspian Sea threatens the extraction and export of Azerbaijani and Central Asian gas and 
oil destined for Turkey and EU member-states. Most Caspian related agreements were 
developed between Russia and Iran during the Soviet-era.  The 1921 Treaty of Friendship 
gave Russia and Iran responsibility for security of the Caspian, plus fishing and 
navigation rights.105 The 1954 Astara-Hasankuli boundary line which notionally connects 
the towns of Astara, Azerbaijan and Hasankuli, Turkmenistan, by mutual USSR-Iranian 
agreement defined the administrative border between the two countries; however, sea 
boundaries were not established under the agreement.106 The Soviet Ministry of Oil and 
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Gas sub-divided the area north of the Astara-Hasankuli line into energy development 
districts administered by the four Soviet Republics bordering the Caspian (Azerbaijan, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan). The fall of the Soviet Union changed the 
geopolitical landscape in the Caspian Basin and magnified the demarcation issue. More 
than twenty years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have not reached an agreement concerning Caspian Sea 
boundaries. The EU and Turkey, more than NATO, can mediate an amicable compromise 
with the energy producing states bordering the Caspian. The potential for confrontation 
on the Caspian Sea is ever-present. Indeed, in 2001 Iranian gunboats threatened a British 
Petroleum research vessel near the Araz-Alov-Sharg offshore oil field which Tehran 
claims is within Iranian territorial waters. Following the incident Turkey dispatched Chief 
of Staff, General Huseyin Kivrikglu and Turkey’s elite military flying team to Azerbaijan 
to demonstrate Ankara’s resolve and support for Baku.107 Turkey provides the credibility 
of a regional neighbor with interest similar to the Caucasian states, and the EU provides 
the institutional economic and diplomatic regimes necessary for conflict resolution and 
mediation. NATO, the EU, and Turkey provide an effective counter-balance to both 
Russia and Iran, but must generate its regional strategy in a manner which includes 
Moscow and Tehran in the dialogue. 
Political cleavages prevail between the Azeri and Turkmen governments and 
similar cases abound between other nations bordering the Caspian region. Azerbaijan 
claims ownership of the disputed Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil field. The State Oil 
Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) is working with British Petroleum to 
develop the fields despite Turkmenistan’s territorial claims. A trans-Caspian pipeline 
from Turkmenistan (holder of the fourth largest gas reserves in the world) through 
Azerbaijan is hampered by the territorial dispute. Turkmenistan, attempted to apply the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which extends territorial waters 
12 nautical miles from the shore; however, Russia protested Turkmenistan’s unilateral 
actions.108 Furthermore, Iran claims the anachronistic agreements between Iran and the 
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Soviet Union still apply to the current regional situation.109  Until the Caspian’s legal 
status and legal regime is codified disputes will continue to hamper private investment in 
upstream oil and gas development, a fundamental requirement to ensure Caspian energy 
routed via Turkey reaches Western Europe and the Balkans.  
The inclusion of Caspian energy in Europe’s mix of energy suppliers potentially 
compels Gazprom to offer competitive pricing and contract terms to EU and NATO 
countries which are heavily dependent on Russian energy. In the Gazprom dominated 
European gas market, oil-indexed pricing persist over market based spot-pricing. For 
many EU-NATO member countries in Central and Eastern Europe, long-term Gas Sale 
and Purchase Agreements with Gazprom and other Russian energy companies are 
indexed against oil.110 Indexed pricing does not represent worldwide supply and demand 
for natural gas; additionally, gas is not subject to the same pricing pressures as oil. Spot-
market pricing (also known as gas-on-gas pricing) is not perfect but reflects the 
competitive market value of gas and allows European countries to use in other domains 
revenue once destined for energy suppliers.  
The EU, NATO, and Turkey’s interrelated energy security and energy 
diversification strategies demand peace in the South Caucasus. A return to hostilities 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan portends disaster for the region socio-politically and 
economically. The BTC (and future pipelines) travel near vulnerable areas; the BTC 
travels only kilometers away from Azeri territory occupied by Armenia, Russia’s outpost 
in South Ossetia, and Kurdish areas of Turkey.111 Recently, military forces from the three 
nations conducted an energy infrastructure security exercises near Ankara.112 EU-NATO 
support for future exercises allows Turkey and the South Caucasus to pool and integrate 
resources and intelligence, and integrate operational procedures. Furthermore, Turkey, 
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operating under a NATO mandate, participating in military exercises with the EU 
potentially strengthens the weakened Ankara-EU link.   
The strategic and economic integration between Turkey, Europe, and Azerbaijan 
creates conditions for dialogue and action on Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey’s policies 
towards Armenia generally mirror those of its economic and cultural ally Azerbaijan. 
However, Turkey finds itself in a position to leverage its power and influence due to 
Azerbaijan’s growing economic entrenchment in large-scale projects in Turkey, such as 
the AGT petrochemical and port infrastructure project. SOCAR and private industry are 
heavily investing in Turkey’s (and Azerbaijan’s) energy infrastructure as it becomes 
increasingly clear that Azerbaijani oil and gas is destined for European markets. The 
energy corporation Chevron’s 2012 annual report supplement, for instance, includes 
investment in Azerbaijan as one of its major capital projects.113 The flow of oil and gas 
out and the flow of financial resources into the region create momentum and coercive 
pressure for states to maintain economic and political stability. A Turkey-led unilateral 
approach bringing Armenia and Azerbaijan together is currently unrealistic; however, 
dialogue within an EU framework perhaps sets conditions for an amicable mandate.  
Additionally, Turkey’s policies towards Armenia indirectly supports the 
continued animosity between Yerevan and Baku, draws Yerevan’s closer to both Russian 
and Iran, and complicates EU-NATO attempts to create an enduring regional security 
architecture and economic development strategy. The Nagorno-Karabakh affair benefits 
Russia by creating circumstances for Russia to maintain a military presence in the region 
and also compliments Moscow’s troop presence in Georgia and support for South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia autonomy. The zero-sum political mindset perpetuated by Moscow where 
EU-NATO “gains” are viewed as a set-back for Russia informs the decision calculus of 
both Armenia and Azerbaijan. During the 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit, Vartan 
Oskanian, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia astutely declared: 
“Turkey is a neighbor whose words, actions, relations—or absence of relations—
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influence the environment in which security concerns must be addressed.”114 Turkey-
Armenia reconciliation is ultimately driven by Ankara’s ability to create space for a 
unilateral policy on Armenia. Conditions for Turkish-Armenian reconciliation and 
normalization of relations are optimal in the next two to three years as the economic 
integration between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and EU increases. Baku’s influence on Ankara-
Yerevan rapprochement are increasingly adulterated as pipelines originating in 
Azerbaijan are laid westward, Azeri investment in Turkish infrastructure grows, and EU 
Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe (INOGATE) partnerships with Central 
Asian states such as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan solidified.  
4. Conclusion 
In summary, the findings suggest Turkey, the EU, and NATO have similar 
interest in the Caucasus: maintaining security and cooperation, resolving “frozen 
conflicts”, and gaining and securing access to Caspian energy. Turkey’s EU accession 
stalemate hampers EU-Turkey communication but similar strategic goals necessitate 
Ankara-EU cooperation. The AKP is attempting to create a unique Turkish position as a 
regional power. However, Turkey’s path to regional power travels through Moscow and 
its influence is magnified through EU-NATO policy instruments.  The EU and NATO are 
able to pursue European interest within all three South Caucasus nations with collective 
institutional mechanisms and resources not available to Ankara. Turkey appears 
inextricably linked economically and to a degree politically to its regional competitor and 
trading partner—Russia. Turkey’s current reliance on Russian energy constrains 
Ankara’s unilateral policies in the Caucasus and creates conditions for policies and 
initiatives counter to EU and NATO interest. Europe, similar to Turkey relies heavily on 
Russian oil and natural gas; however the EU is positioned to deter Russia from wielding 
energy as a coercive tool. A unified European front wields greater diplomatic leverage 
against Moscow than Ankara’s unilateralism. Ankara is best served by nesting its energy 
diversification interest within an EU-NATO framework when engaging with Russia.  
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Turkey-Armenia rapprochement is overshadowed by Ankara’s support for 
Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the competing national narratives 
concerning the atrocities in 1915, and Armenian refutation of the Turkish-Armenian 
border defined by the 1921 Treaty of Kars. Turkey must balance its actions and rhetoric 
vis-à-vis Armenia to ensure Ankara a prominent role in future dialogue on the Nagorno-
Karabakh question, and work within European institutions and regimes such as the OSCE 
Minsk Group. Turkey’s lack of a relationship with Armenia is counterproductive to EU-
NATO objectives in the region. The nature of Azerbaijani-Turkish relations is positive 
for energy security and diversification but perpetuates the ongoing distrust between 




IV. LEVANT REGIONAL ASSESMENT 
A. TURKEY, THE EU, AND NATO IN THE LEVANT REGION 
The region described in the West as the Middle East, roughly spans from the 
eastern shores of the Mediterranean to the Western borders of China and India; and from 
the southern coast of Yemen to the southern borders of Central Asia in the north. The 
people, histories, languages, cultures, religions, and politics are diverse. This study 
concentrates on EU-NATO and Turkish interaction in the Middle East’s Levant region 
(Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the Occupied Territories, and Jordan) with emphasis on Syria, 
Israel, and the Palestinian territories it occupies. Syria and Israel are the primary regional 
actors which garner international attention and whose policies influence whether peace 
and stability or insecurity and conflict define the region.  The term Levant defines the 
region geographically; the heterogeneous mixture of religions, ethnicities, politics, and 
cultures makes other forms of alignment futile. Religions in the region, for example, 
range from various forms of Judaism (primarily Rabbinates), Islam (Shia and Sunni), and 
Christianity (Orthodox, Maronite, Coptic Catholics) to the somewhat esoteric practices of 
the Druze.115 The region is home to the Arab-Israeli conflict which has smoldered and 
erupted in various forms from the early nineteenth century to present. The conflicts 
current incarnation, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, consumes much of the diplomatic 
energy and resources of the West, specifically the United States. The EU, searching for a 
stage to demonstrate its global political credibility, and NATO, losing its primary raison 
d’être, are each haltingly attempting to expand their influence in the region under the 
weight of the European economic downturn and ten years of expeditionary warfare. 
Under the AKP Turkey is attempting a return to its historical and cultural sphere of 
influence.  
EU-NATO policies for the Levant are similar to Europe’s policies in the South 
Caucasus; increasing or fostering stability, security, and economic well-being, and 
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partnering with regional actors to prevent conflict and resolve ongoing issues.116 
Turkey’s policy goals are driven by both a desire for Turkish prestige in formerly 
Ottoman lands, but also a need to engender stability, set conditions for greater economic 
integration, and create new markets for Turkish good and services.  
1. Historical and Contemporary Turkey’s Ottoman Legacy and 
Europe’s “Great Game” 
The Ottoman Sultans ruled over the vast Middle East Empire with an invisible 
hand, not by design but from necessity. War and famine reduced Ottoman manpower and 
its ability to hold sway over regional ayan (notables-lords).117 Europe from the early 
1800’s through the end of World War II viewed the region through an imperial lens 
characterized by intrigue and rivalry. The efforts of the European powers in the years 
leading up to the First World War and the ensuing division of the Middle East are the 
cause of many of the issues the EU, NATO, and Turkey are confronting today in the 
Levant. 
One important element of Turkish-European relations in the nineteenth century is 
the link between Christian communities under Ottoman rule and the European power’s 
domestically influenced desire for protectorate status over these populations—a sub-
element of the broader so-called “Eastern Question.” The 1853 to 1856 Crimean War 
started as a dispute between France and Austria on one side and Russia on the other over 
whether the Catholic or Orthodox Church should hold authority over the holy places in 
Palestine such as the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. The Russian tsar demanded 
the Ottoman Porte give Russia power over the Orthodox peoples in Ottoman territory; the 
Porte refused with the backing of the French and British. Following Russian occupation 
of Ottoman Wallachia and Moldavia, the Ottomans, France, and Britain declared war on 
Russia.118  
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Ottoman support for Jews fleeing European Christian persecution and settling in 
Ottoman territory in the 1800’s is a historical example showing an undercurrent, a 
memory linking the Ottoman Sultanate and Levantine Jewry to the present Turkey-Israeli 
relationship. Importantly, Sultan Abdül Hamid (1876 to 1909) denounced Jewish 
settlement of Palestine due primarily to Palestinian-Arab resistance, but the Sultan 
ultimately ignored the migration of European Jews to, and growth of, the Jewish 
community in Palestine.119 Turkey recognized the Israeli state in 1949 and as the next 
section attest the relationship throughout the years is a mix of cooperation and dissent. 
Discontent among the Empire’s large Christian populations created another 
avenue for European rivalry in the Ottoman Levant. In 1860 Maronite Christian peasants 
in Lebanon fought a civil war against the Druze land owners. The fighting resulted in the 
deaths of roughly 5,000 Christians in Damascus and the military intervention of France 
whose efforts to re-engineer the administration of Ottoman Lebanon and Syria were 
opposed by the Porte with British support.120     
The 1908 Young Turk revolution usurped the Sultans imperial power and 
signaled the end of the Sultanate and the solidification of a Turkish nationalist movement 
fostered by the educated cosmopolitan elites.121 The Young Turk’s Committee of Union 
and Progress (CUP) expected inclusion in the European system on equal terms with the 
European powers but soon found France, Britain, Russia, and to a lesser extent, Italy 
intended to dismantle the Empire without acknowledgement of CUP legitimacy.122 The 
CUP’s attempt to centralize authority catalyzed nationalist revolts throughout the 
Empire’s semi-autonomous regions.  
Ten years later, the disastrous outcome of the First World War resulted in the 
1920 Treaty of Sèvres which completed dismantled the Ottoman Empire. In the Levant, 
the French gained control of Syria; Palestine was proclaimed a British protectorate and 
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eventual national homeland of the Jewish people.123 The post-World War I settlement 
and parceling of formerly Ottoman territory in the spirit of the 1916 Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, and the 1917 Balfour Declaration which was incorporated into the 1920 
Treaty of Sèvres solidified the European imprint on the Levant and the whole Middle 
East region. It was only after the rise of Mustafa Kemal that the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne 
softened the Sèvres Treaty’s harsh territorial claims. It was during this same period that 
1921 Ankara Treaty between the new Turkish republic and France laid the groundwork 
for eventual Turkish control of the formerly Syrian province of Alexandretta (Hatay)—an 
agreement that plagues current Syria-Turkish relations.124  
Kemalism and Cold War era alignments further divided Turkey from the Middle 
East. The new Turkish republic which emerged from the ashes of World War One sought 
alignment with the West. Mustafa Kemal’s secular and westward leaning vision 
portrayed the Middle East as less progressive and a region in whose affairs Turkey must 
not become mired. Moscow’s support for Arab states in the Arab-Israeli conflict; 
Turkey’s membership in the anti-Communist 1955 Baghdad Pact; and Turkey’s attempts 
at unilateral military action against Syria during its 1957 crisis and against Iraq after the 
1958 toppling of the pro-west Hashemite monarchy solidified the divorcement from the 
Arab Middle East.125  
The period from roughly the early 1800s to the mid-1900s displays an enduring 
line of European rivalry, influence, and intrigue in the Levant (and the Middle East in 
general). The decisions made by the Triple Entente (France, Britain, and Russia) continue 
to influence Middle East security and the interest and policies of the EU, NATO, and 
Turkey in the Levant.  
2. Turkish and EU-NATO Regional Interest and Policies 
This section reflects on the relationship between EU-NATO and Turkish foreign 
policies, and the related continuity and discontinuity between European and Turkish 
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approaches in relation to the two primary actors in the Levant—Syria and Israel. The 
Arab-Israeli conflict is also examined within the context of the Palestinian struggle for 
autonomy and territory in the Israeli occupied territories.  
Most recently, the so-called Arab Spring’s dismantlement of authoritarian regimes 
provided Turkey the opportunity to transform its regional policies and step into mediation 
position once held by states such as Egypt. Turkey relies heavily on its civil-society and 
private sector interactions to compliment government efforts in the region. After two 
Middle East wars over roughly a ten year period, the U.S. is weary and struggles to put 
forth diplomatic energy in the region’s troubled areas such as the Levant. Turkey is 
attempting to fill the void and exercise its soft-power through diplomacy and economic 
integration. Currently, the AKP is propelled by religious and nostalgic Ottoman ties, and 
a degree of Turkish exceptionalism in its effort to gain what Turkish Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu termed “strategic depth,” a vision of Turkey as the active center of 
multiple regions where multi-regional economic integration is a major component in 
ensuring the continued prosperity of the center (i.e., Turkey). 
Historically, Turkey’s policies in the Levant are driven by pragmatic interest, but 
to a lesser extent than is found in its South Caucasus policies. Turkey, its people and 
government, estranged from the Middle East for decades, is attempting to re-establish the 
relationships which suffered as a result of the political and relational dynamics fostered 
by Kemalism and the Cold War era international system. Pragmatism and self-interest, 
versus adherence to international norms or regimes, is a theme in Turkey’s Middle 
Eastern policies throughout the post-World War II period. During the Iran-Iraq war, for 
example, and despite Ankara’s (and the Turkish publics) mistrust of Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini’s Islamist Iran, Ankara ignored the U.S.-led economic embargo on Tehran and 
continued trade with its economically beleaguered neighbor; conversely, during the war 
Turkey allowed Iraq to pipe oil via Turkey to sites on the Mediterranean.126  
Ankara’s relationship with Damascus oscillates between warm and cold. Turkey 
is routinely involved in struggles with its Levantine neighbor over the Hatay province 
                                                 
126 Zurcher, Turkey, 325 
 44
(Alexandretta), Tigris-Euphrates river water-flow, Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, 
Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) terrorism, and most recently the overflow of Syria civil-war 
violence into Turkish territory.  Turkey called for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to 
initiate political reforms and halt the brutal crackdown on the internal revolt; later Ankara 
demanded Assad’s resignation.127 After the Syrian’s shot down a Turkish military 
aircraft on patrol straddling the Syria-Turkey border and other incidents resulting in the 
deaths of Turkish civilians the relationship between Ankara and the Assad government 
appears irrecoverable. Syria’s support of the PKK cause from the early 1980s to the late 
1990’s widened the gap between Ankara and Damascus. Indeed, Syrian President Hafez 
al-Assad provided refuge to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, and training for PKK fighters. 
Ankara demonstrated its anger and resolve on the issue by massing its troops on the 
Turkey-Syrian border in 1998.128 The show of force compelled Damascus to expel 
Öcalan from Syria. Water security is increasingly a national security issue for Middle 
East states. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers which originates in Turkey and travels 
through Syria (and Iraq) are a source of tension as Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia 
Project, a system of hydroelectric dams, power-plants, and irrigation projects along the 
Tigris and Euphrates, threatens downstream water supply. In reaction to hydro-political 
tension between Ankara and Damascus, Syrian fighter jets shot down a civilian Turkish 
land survey aircraft in 1989.129 Moreover, in 1990 Turkey used water as an instrument of 
state policy against Syria by temporarily reducing the downstream flow of the Euphrates 
River in protest of Damascus’ support for PKK leader Öcalan.130  
The relationship between Ankara and Damascus transformed favorably in the 
early 2000’s. The AKP maintained positive relations with Syria despite both U.S. and EU 
pressure after the U.S. Congress issued the 2003 Syrian Accountability Act and the U.S. 
and EU’s condemnations and accusations against Syria following the February 2005 
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assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Refik Hariri.131 In line with its “zero 
problems” policy approach Ankara hosted a water scarcity summit with Syria (and Iraq) 
in 2009.132 However, the current Syrian civil war is causing soured relations between 
Damascus and Ankara as Turkey attempts to contain the violence along the Syria-Turkey 
border and provide humanitarian assistance to roughly 200,000 war refugees.133  
Turkey’s relationship with Israel oscillates between strong and weak on both the 
military and political front. The issues that dominate the cautious partnership over 
roughly the last twenty years include the threat posed by Syria, the Palestinian question, 
and the greater Arab-Israeli conflict. The 1990s Turkish-Israeli friendship demonstrates 
Turkey’s realpolitik in the face of Arab perturbation. The fall of the Soviet Union left 
Syria and Iraq on the international periphery; Damascus, along with Baghdad and Tehran, 
formed a front against Israel exemplified by Saddam Hussein’s rocket attacks on Israel 
during the 1991 Gulf War, and Syria and Iran’s proxy war against Israel using the 
Lebanon-based Hezbollah militant organization. Turkey during the same period, unclear 
of its geostrategic role after the Soviet collapse, sought a means to increase its profile in 
the West and simultaneously mitigate the Syrian threat. The 1996 Turkish-Israeli military 
cooperation agreement is a case where Turkey’s domestic terrorism (PKK) and mistrust 
of Syria informed Ankara’s decision to ally with Tel-Aviv. The Israeli Air Force 
benefited from flying long-range simulated bombing missions using Turkish training 
areas and the Turkish Air Force took advantage of the Israeli’s high-tech training 
systems.134 Additionally, Turkey and Israel shared intelligence information relating to 
Syria; Israel provided information on PKK related activity; and the agreement authorized 
joint strategic research and technology transfer.135   
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In the AKP era Turkish-Israeli relations over roughly the last eleven years is 
overshadowed by differing perspectives on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  The Second 
Intifada (2000–2005), which began roughly two years prior to the AKP election victory, 
and Israel’s Operation Caste Lead (2008–2009) in Gaza, set the tone for relations 
between the AKP and Israel. Turkey viewed itself as a conflict mediator similar to the 
U.S., and a Palestinian advocate during the crisis, whereas Israel believed Turkey was 
best suited to facilitate and assist Israel in developing amicable relationships with 
regional Arab states.136 Ankara potentially overreached its regional influence and 
demonstrated its misunderstanding of the political dynamics which necessitate Israel’s 
need for the U.S. as the mediator. Israel, for instance, maintains a strong lobby in 
Washington, D.C. and is able to shape U.S. foreign policy through this mechanism.137 
Turkey actively continued to provide unilateral indirect support to the Quartet’s (EU, UN, 
U.S., and Russia) Road Map for peace by providing the Palestinians with humanitarian 
assistance through TIKA and Turkish non-governmental organizations. Turkey and EU 
perspectives of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are similar, and differ from the position of 
the U.S. and Israel. Both Turkey and the EU believe a solution to the conflict must 
precede any attempts at reform.138 Both the AKP and the EU adamantly disagree with the 
targeted killing of Palestinian Hamas leaders such as Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Hassan 
Yassin, assassinated by Israel in 2004; consequently, in protest Erdogan postponed a trip 
to Israel declaring Tel-Aviv’s actions an act of terrorism.139  
Despite cleavages in the Turkish-Israeli relationship several examples 
demonstrate the potential for positive relations between Ankara and Tel-Aviv, and the 
maturation of the political and economic components of the relationship. In 2005, for 
example, a telephone hotline between Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
allowed the two leaders to share information on common security issues such as 
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terrorism; moreover, in 2007 Shimon Peres became the first Israeli Prime Minister to 
speak before the Turkish Grand National Assembly.140 In the short-term, Turkish-Israeli 
relations are influenced by the 2010 Mavi Marmara Flotilla incident where Israeli 
commandos killed nine Turkish citizen en route to Gaza, and to a lesser extent Israel’s 
2012 Israeli Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza. Erdoğan’s policy requirement after the 
Flotilla incident included: a formal apology from Israel (which Erdoğan received March 
2013 from Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu); an end to the Gaza blockade; 
and compensation for the victims’ families.141  Despite the combative rhetoric in the 
wake of the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident and disagreements over the Palestinian 
question, Turkish-Israeli dialogue continues in the military sector and trade is reaching 
new heights in keeping with the strong economic trade component of the AKP policy. 
Turkish 2011 exports of goods such as iron, steel, automobiles, and textiles to Israel 
totaled 2.4 billion dollars; Turkish imports of Israeli goods totaled 1.4 billion dollars in 
2010 and included crude oil products, plastics, and chemicals.142  
Low profile high level security discussions continue between Turkish and Israeli 
officials despite the tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv.  In 2012, for instance, 
Turkey’s senior intelligence officer and the head of Israeli Mossad met in Cairo, and in 
Geneva senior representatives from the Turkish and Israeli foreign ministries met to 
discuss Gaza and other regional issues.143 The Syrian civil war and the potential for the 
country to collapse into sectarian violence ensure continued cooperation between the 
Turkish and Israeli defense and intelligence establishment. 
EU-NATO is recovering from the recent economic crisis and 10 years of war in 
Afghanistan. Europeans are consumed by domestic welfare issues more so than strategic 
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interest in the Middle East; the EU and NATO’s political and diplomatic lethargy in the 
region reflects the trend. The EU is steered by the interest of the Franco-German front, 
each appears to have stronger interest in other regions such as North Africa for France; 
Germany appears interested in managing its now tepid relationship with Russia. 
Additionally, inward looking issues on the European economic front and domestic issues 
are of primary concern for EU member states. NATO’s shortfalls in the realm of 
socioeconomic capability limit its soft-power impact in the Levant. The influx of 
European funding and resources to the region is significant; however the EU-NATO 
political and diplomatic activity on issues such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is 
lusterless.  
EU and NATO interest and policies in the Middle East dovetail with those of 
Turkey, but the diplomatic energy applied by the European institutions are not equivalent 
to the challenges presented by the region. The EU and NATO policies follow both a 
regional and bi-lateral approach to increasing security, stability, and democratic rights. 
This section analyzes EU and NATO policies relevant to the Levant to determine their 
effectiveness and congruencies with Turkish bi-lateral activity in the region. Importantly, 
EU-NATO and Turkish policies attempt to reduce spillover effects from the Syrian civil 
war. Turkey is demonstrating its policy objectives by arming resistance fighters. Along 
with the U.S. and members of the Arab League, the EU and Turkey are implementing 
sanctions against the Assad regime.144 
The EU Security Strategy proclaims: “Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a 
strategic priority for Europe” and a two-state solution, cooperatively road-mapped by the 
Quartet, the Israelis, and the Palestinians is the only viable solution.145 The EU’s policies 
for Syria are in limbo as the country writhes in the grip of civil war.  The rift between EU 
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members on whether or not to arm Syria’s anti-government fighters highlights the EU’s 
struggle to develop a homogenous security identity.146  
The EU as a member of the Quartet plays a significant role in the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. Several EU countries maintain regional diplomatic missions 
for direct contact with the PA. Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and 
Britain maintain consulates in Jerusalem; additionally, Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Portugal all maintain some form of diplomatic 
footprint in the West Bank.147 The European diplomatic missions are a remnant of a time 
when Europe was optimistic about the implementation of 1947 UN resolution 181 which 
mandated the division of Palestine into a separate state and establishment of the 
Jerusalem international zone.148 Despite the failure of the UN resolution the European 
missions to Palestine in conjunction with their embassy counterparts play a role in 
administering EU policies relevant to both Palestine and Israel. 
The EU’s actions in the Middle East began in earnest with the ambitious 1995 
Barcelona Declaration. The declaration covered a broad range of socioeconomic and 
political concerns important to peace and stability in the Levant region. The objectives 
included: developing free-trade areas for economic cooperation, recognizing territorial 
integrity, reducing of trans-border crime and terrorism, creating education and training 
programs, and fostering cultural accommodation and human rights. The vision and 
objectives arguably are suited for the countries outside of the Levant region considering 
Israel’s semi-permanent state of conflict with both the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The idea of the Barcelona Declaration is closely 
linked to the anticipation generated by the 1993 Oslo Accords peace process between 
Israeli Government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The Barcelona 
Declaration acknowledges the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, the 
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progenitor to the Oslo Accords, as the guiding beacon for the declaration.149 
Unfortunately, the Barcelona Process, the conceptual framework supporting the 
Barcelona Declaration, succumbed to disrepair in the wake of the second Intifada, the 
2003 Iraq War, and so-called War on Terror. The declaration’s signatories included the 
EU member-states, Turkey, the Levant states, the Palestinian Authority (PA), and other 
countries located in the Mediterranean and North Africa.150 The Barcelona Process 
(EUROMED) re-emerged as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).151 UfM is a 
reintroduction and expansion of EUROMED which consisted of the 27 EU nations, 
Turkey, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the PA, and other members from across the Southern 
Mediterranean, African and Middle Eastern.152   
The EU introduced the ENP in 2004 as a broader multi-regional engagement 
project which includes the Middle East, North African, South Caucasus states, the 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. The EU Barcelona Process mandate is built on a multi-
lateral regional concept for peace and stability, economic integration, and sociocultural 
partnership whereas the ENP attempts to implement unilateral Action Plans and resources 
provided through the ENPI contingent on the regional partners meeting agreed upon 
conditions. The Palestinian Authority Action Plan, for example, states a contractual 
relationship between the EU and PA is possible if the PA meets certain objectives.153 
Additionally, the ENPI, similar to the Barcelona Process, maintains “cross-border 
cooperation programs” which supports areas such as region-based education initiatives, 
governance, and economic integration. The ENPI attempts to explain the relationship, 
boundaries, and bridges between it and the Barcelona Process; however, evident suggest 
overlap and redundancy in multiple areas such as education and governance.154  
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The source of the EU policies ineffectiveness in the Levant is not only the 
technical and bureaucratic aspects of the policies and instruments; it is the fact that inter-
regional ties are nearly non-existent. Israel maintains only relatively close ties to Jordan, 
its historical ally in the Arab world. Tel-Aviv’s diplomatic, economic, and social ties to 
Lebanon and Syria are nearly non-existent. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is the shadow 
government providing civil services to the large Shia population on the same level as the 
Lebanese government. Hezbollah does not recognize the right for Israeli existence, a 
fundamental issue that prevents dialogue; additionally, the Lebanese government views 
Israel as an existential threat—not Hezbollah. Hamas won the Palestinian Parliamentary 
elections in 2006 but Israel refused to develop diplomatic ties with the government and 
the U.S. boycotted the results. Both Hezbollah and Hamas are on the EU (and U.S.) list 
of terrorist organizations; however, the two organizations legally represent large 
segments of society in their respective country and territory to which they are held 
accountable; indeed, Hezbollah has peacefully participated in Lebanese elections since 
1992.155  
Additionally, the ENP policies for the Levant countries are dated “2004” and 
consequently do not reflect the changed regional context in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) as the dust from the Arab Spring settles. 
The EU ENP’s for the Levant region consist of Action Plans for each Levant 
Nation plus the PA. The EU’s Palestinian Authority Action Plan (dated 2004) is similar 
to other ENP Action Plans for the region, covering areas such as political, economic, 
social, and institutional reform, but it also recognizes the limited space for 
implementation in the unstable and insecure Israeli-Palestinian neighborhood. The plan 
emphasizes among other things: facilitating the resolution of the Middle East conflict; 
relieving the humanitarian crisis; strengthening the rule of law; progressing on the 
economic and education front; and decreasing anti-Semitism and “Islamophobia.”156 
Under the democracy and rule of law paragraph, the “organization of transparent general 
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and local elections” is defined as an important objective. In the case of the electoral 
success of Hamas, the EU (and the U.S.) must reconcile the dissonance created when the 
popularly elected government is considered a terrorist organization by the international 
community. The EU supports the PA security capacity through the EU Coordinating 
Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) and Palestinian Civil Police 
Development Programme. Palestinian Authority Police make frequent trips to Europe, 
most recently the Palestinian officials visited Ireland under EU COPPS funding to 
provide exposure to the operations of modern Criminal Forensic Laboratory to 
understand the role of forensic science in a mature criminal justice system.157 
The EU’s unilateral leverage over Israeli policy is limited due primarily to the 
support provided Tel-Aviv by the U.S. Israel collects and then withholds roughly 
$100 million dollars in Palestinian tax revenues each month from fear the money will 
reach Hamas and Fatah.158 The EU attempts to ensure the PA receives direct financial 
support for recurrent cost and public services through the EU-developed PEGASE 
mechanism.159 The EU’s funding, as the largest donor, is indispensable to Palestinian 
education, healthcare, civil services, and other needs; additionally, such services are 
provide in Palestinian refugee camps in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon in coordination with 
the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).160 Under UNRWA EU contributions 
totaled roughly €590.5 million.161 In May 2013 alone the EU contributed €19.2 million to 
the Palestinian Authority’s salary and pension program.162 It was only after U.S. 
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Presidents Barak Obama’s March 2013 visit that the Netanyahu government agreed to 
release the funds needed to pay Palestinian public sector employees.163  
Israel is a modern state with solid and stable institutions, and a vibrant export 
economy. Within “green-line” Israel, the territorial demarcation mandated by the 1949 
Armistice Agreement, regimes are in place that mirror and seamlessly interact with 
international institutions. Rule of law, a modern justice system, a liberalized economy, 
social welfare, and an active civil society are already in place. Israeli trade with the EU 
totaled roughly €29 billion euro in 2012, with total EU exports of €17 billion.164 The EU 
Action Plan for Israel attempts to further EU-Israel cooperation and eventual integration 
but also speaks to the rift between Israelis and Palestinians and transnational security 
issues. The EU Action Plans are bi-lateral in nature and the contractual component is 
activated after certain conditions are met, for Israel, supporting Action Plan priorities 
such as facilitating political dialogue and cooperation on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
a pre-condition for contractual agreements between Tel-Aviv and Brussels.165 Israel’s 
continued settlement of the occupied territories, and house demolitions and evictions of 
Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank under the Netanyahu government 
abrogate the agreements in the EU-Israel Action Plan; consequently, the EU in 2009 
froze continued upgrade of EU-Israeli bilateral relations.166 
In 1994 NATO instituted its Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) with seven Middle 
Eastern and North African countries. By 2000 the members included Tunisia, Egypt, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, and Israel. Through the Dialogue NATO attempts 
to develop a common understanding between NATO and non-NATO Mediterranean 
countries; eliminate misconceptions about the Alliance; and play a role in regional 
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security with the objective of creating security along Europe’s periphery.167 Similar to 
the NATO PfP programs in Europe and the South Caucasus, the MD program offers 
tailored bilateral Individual Cooperation Programs where member countries define short 
and long-term cooperation objectives. Similar to the EU’s Action Plan members, MD 
partners choose the “pace and extent” of involvement in the program.168 Politically the 
dialogue provides the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General an avenue to 
conduct high-level security discussions with officials in the MD member states. Militarily 
the Mediterranean Dialogue Work Program (MDWP) focuses on a wide range of security 
related activities such as: counter-terrorism, defense policy and strategy, border security, 
military education, civil emergency planning, and crisis management.169  
NATO’s ability to implement the regional activities are impacted by several 
factors: the U.S. shift to the Pacific; shrinking European military budgets following more 
than a decade of war in Afghanistan; mismatch in values between NATO and some of the 
more authoritarian partners; mistrust of Israel by the Arab members in light of ongoing 
Palestinian-Israeli and Israeli-Hezbollah related frictions, and lastly, Turkey’s veto power 
against NATO events which include Israel. These objectives impact the Muslim countries 
more so than Israel. Israel maintains close military-to-military ties to the U.S. and applies 
operational concepts which are similar to NATO standards. Operation Juniper Cobra, for 
instance, provides Israel with ballistic missile defense interoperability and procedural 
understanding that informs U.S.-led EPAA ballistic missile defense for NATO. 
The policy methods, rhetoric, and interest of EU-NATO and Ankara are similar in 
the Levant.  Turkey’s proximity to the region, historical and cultural ties, and the respect 
it receives from the Arab states provides it with a degree of clout equivalent to the EU, 
even though the EU provides enormous support and financial aid to the PA and 
Palestinians located on regional refugee camps. Paradoxically, it is Turkey’s ties to the 
West through NATO and the EU accession process, moreover, its ability to straddle the 
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fence between east and the west without appearing as a tool of western interest, which 
gains it the respect of many in the Middle East.  
Israel creates a dilemma for both Turkey and the European organizations. Turkey 
must determine what type of relationship it wants with Israel and for what purposes, and 
balance its ties with both Tel-Aviv and Arab nations in the region. EU-NATO must 
reflect on the terms of cooperation contractually agreed upon with Israel in the context of 
the frozen discourse on the Palestine two-state solution. The AKP’s emerging policies, 
such as arming Syrian rebels and allowing Syrian opposition leaders to conduct meetings 
on Turkish soil reflect the new reality. Conversely, arming the rebels also contradicts the 
idea of “zero problems” with neighbors. Turkey more than EU-NATO believes a 
dialogue with influential actors, such as Hamas (and Hezbollah), organizations that are 
considered pariahs by the international community, is required for an eventual peaceful 
settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Ironically, member countries of both the EU 
and NATO (to include the AKP) maintained relations and economic ties with oppressive 
regimes in Libya and Egypt prior to the Arab Spring uprisings. Turkey is potentially an 
inoculator for developing a dialogue with Hamas leaders, but importantly, the AKP must 
reflect on the potential for its relationship to damage the legitimacy and authority of the 
EU-supported PA. 
3. Aligned and Divergent Policies and Interest: Consequences and 
Opportunities 
Economic integration is creating the most headway for Israeli-Palestinian 
cooperation and Turkish business leaders are supporting the integration process. The 
Israeli and Palestinian National Committees of International Chamber of Commerce 
selected Turkish businessman and chairman of the Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey, Rıfat Hisarcıklıoğlu as a co-chairman of the Jerusalem Arbitration 
Center which mediates commercial conflicts between Israeli and Palestinian 
businesses.170 Hisarcıklıoğlu is also the chairman of the Union of Chambers and 
                                                 




Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) which promotes trans-boundary trade and 
manages the Erez Industrial Zone located between Gaza and Israel.171 Organizations such 
as TOBB provide the means and technical ability to increase regional trade and economic 
integration. Turkey’s visa policy also supports regional economic integration.172 
Turkey’s liberal visa policy and Europe-focused trade regimes lays a foundation for 
eventual seamless trade and economic integration between the EU and the Levant. The 
EU’s Palestinian Authority Action Plan mentions providing the PA “a significant degree 
of [economic] integration” and “a stake in the EU’s Internal Market.”173 The Turkish 
government’s ties to Gaza and the West Bank and the experience in EU markets and 
regimes found in the Turkish private potentially accelerates Gaza and West Bank 
economic integration and facilitates understanding of EU economic mechanisms among 
Palestinian businesses. 
Turkey, NATO, the EU, and Israel each have vested interest in the outcome in the 
Syrian civil war. The potential for Turkey’s influence in the Levant is contingent upon 
the fall of the Assad government in Syria, and the loosening of Iranian power over 
Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The Turkish-Syria and Iraqi-Syrian border region is home to the 
majority of Syrian Kurds, many of whom supported the PKK in its thirty year struggle 
with the Turkish government.  How Turkey handles calls for a federalized Syrian 
Kurdistan impacts both the delicate peace between Ankara and the PKK and the demands 
of Turkey’s own Kurdish population. The diverse group of Syrian rebel organizations 
presents a conundrum for the AKP. Turkey and Saudi Arabia hold differing opinions on 
which rebel forces to support; the AKP supports the Syrian National Council, an 
organization influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, whereas the Saudis are vehemently 
against the Brotherhood.174 Moreover, as EU members such as France and Britain, 
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contemplate unilaterally arming rebels, one must ask if the Syrian rebel organizations EU 
nations are willing to support differ from those Ankara is supporting, and how does this 
play out politically if the war turns into a factional fight between rebel organizations? 
In the event of Syrian collapse, Western institutions must not regard Turkey’s 
political system as a model for the new Syrian government. The idea of a so-called 
“Turkish Model” for the Middle East, or specifically for Syria in the event revolutionary 
forces defeat the Assad regime, is overstated. Turkey’s transformation is the product of a 
historical, sociopolitical, and socioeconomic context unique to Turkey. Additionally, 
Arab support for the model and admiration of the AKP must be viewed in the context of 
Turkey’s drifting relationship with Israel and current stance on the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. In the event of Syrian collapse Turkey and EU-NATO [and the U.S. and Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC)] must find common ground if a revolutionary Syrian 
government seeks post-conflict reconstruction support. Each must harmonize incentives 
and criteria in areas such as democratization, rule of law, inclusive governance, and 
security sector reform. The issue of democratization is a potential source of friction for 
GCC countries which recently suppressed domestic Arab Spring uprisings. The 
possibility of sociopolitical transformation in Syria creates the opportunity for a moderate 
Islamic republic such as Turkey to act as an facilitator of dialogue among the warring 
factions and an influential co-partner to the EU. 
 In the case of NATO’s MD program, the MENA partners are potentially 
suspicious of NATO and are reluctant participants in a security program that includes 
Israel. Supporting Turkey as a lead nation for the program takes advantage of cultural 
similarities. Israel is the only Levant region member of the organization. Contingent on 
continued rapprochement, Ankara and Tel-Aviv can take advantage of the continuity 
provided by long-standing security agreements. If fences are not mended between Israel 
and Turkey further NATO cooperation with Israel within the MD or any other context is 
hampered by Ankara’s veto power in NATO. Indeed, Turkey vetoed a recently planned 
MD event despite Israel’s apology for the Mavi Marmara-Flotilla incident.175 
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The Arab Spring created opportunity and instability, and for EU-NATO and 
Turkey it provides the opportunity to influence regional stability and governmental 
modes and re-evaluate regional policies. Moreover, the Arab Spring potentially opens the 
door for Turkey to gain a foothold in the Middle East after years of neglecting past 
relationships. Importantly, Turkey (and the EU) must take account of the Arab position. 
Ankara-GCC cooperation is cautious and influenced by modern Turkey’s Ottoman 
legacy, secular origins, and Cold War era stance; however similar regional interest 
creates space for cooperation.   
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Levant is one of the most volatile and complex regions in the 
Middle East. Its nations are at the epicenter of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the latest 
Middle East war in Syria. The AKP over roughly the last 10 years is growing more 
institutionally ingrained with its Arab neighbors and is attempting to carve out a sphere of 
influence in formerly Ottoman lands. Evidence suggests Turkey is using bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral relationships and mechanism in the region to increase its influence and role 
as a co-mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Maintaining co-existing relationships 
with Israel and Hamas demonstrates the AKP’s pragmatic nature. Security agreements 
with Israel are viewed as important for Turkish interest by the AKP. Ankara’s ties to Tel 
Avis are at one of its weakest points in the AKP era; however the rift is based on policy 
differences versus anti-Jewish sentiment engendered by the Palestinian question. Turkey 
maintains relationships with Hamas and Hezbollah to the consternation of Israel, the 
U.S., and to a lesser extent the EU. Hamas is an influential element in Palestinian life and 
politics and Turkey and to a lesser degree the EU views the organization as integral to 
long-term peace process. The opportunity to cleave Hamas away from Syrian and Iranian 
influence is magnified in light of the Syrian civil war and the potential loss of Iran’s 
Syrian ally in the Levant.  
Turkey is unencumbered by the consensus process that binds and slows EU 
decisions; consequently, the AKP is able to react quickly to changing circumstances and 
apply a degree of realpolitik to its efforts in the Levant. The EU provides a visionary 
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framework, value system, and deep pockets, but Turkey, provides the sociocultural 
bridge. Turkey as a moderate Muslin state and supporter of the Syrian resistance 
potentially provides a major supporting role in the event of regime change.  Importantly, 
more than Europe, Ankara’s interest and vulnerability is urgent in the event Assad 
maintains control of Syria. In the long-term a continuation of the Assad regime creates 
issues for NATO in the event Assad takes action against Turkey which requires NATO 
Article V support. 
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The research provided in this study of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP 
government is meant to determine Turkey’s foreign policy direction and its impact on EU 
and NATO security and foreign policies. An enduring but inconstant link between 
Turkey and Europe exist from the Ottoman period to the present. The interest and foreign 
policies of EU-NATO and Turkey overlap and influences the geostrategic prospects for 
multiple regions. Throughout the roughly ninety year existence of the modern Turkish 
republic, Turkey’s secular and moderate Islamist governments sought to maintain the link 
to the West through both informal unilateral relationships (with the U.S.) and binding ties 
through Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO. The decade-long dominance of the 
moderate Islamist AKP in Turkish politics, ensuing economic growth, and the frozen EU 
accession process set the conditions for Ankara to practice independent foreign policies. 
In the process of defining and executing an independent foreign policy, is Turkey now 
drifting eastward under an Islamist mandate? 
The empirical evidence suggests Turkey’s unilateralist foreign policy trajectory 
under the AKP government is not a sign of Ankara disengaging from the West; 
furthermore, the policy is grounded in pragmatic self-interest versus political Islam. 
Ankara understands the source of its power lies primarily in a secularized approach and 
its unique link to European institutions. There are shared EU-NATO and Turkish 
interests that potentially lead to common policy objectives and multilateral approaches; 
however, it is important to remember that Turkey seeks to carve out a unique position of 
influence within all regions it borders in keeping with its multi-vectored approach. In 
studying the South Caucasus and Levant it is clear Ankara’s objectives include: fostering 
peace and stability, investing in economic integration and development, and supporting 
an amicable settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the frozen conflicts in the 
South Caucasus. The context and rational for Turkey’s increased contact with the Middle 
East must be evaluated against the power of other regional actors. Russia is dominant in 
the South Caucasus and is Turkey’s primary energy provider; EU-NATO is strong in the 
Balkans and holds great interest in ensuring another Balkans implosion does not occur; 
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the path of least political resistance, the East, also held the greatest cultural linkage for 
Turkey. 
Turkey’s historical and cultural linkage to the South Caucasus and the Levant, 
and particularly the volatility and complexity of the interactions between multiple actors 
in the two regions results in exigencies that lead to the AKP’s fluctuating and at times 
contradictory policy positions. In the South Caucasus the shadow of Russia constrains 
Turkey’s policy options and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in particular is a Gordian 
knot which binds Ankara’s relationship with both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Ankara’s 
interests in the South Caucasus are heavily influenced by Caspian energy and the 
potential for Turkey to gain further economic and political prominence as an energy 
corridor to Europe. Both NATO and EU security documents emphasize the importance of 
energy security and diversification in Europe’s future strategic environment thus 
emphasizing an opportunity for multilateral cooperation on issues such as Russian 
obstructionism and Caspian Sea demarcation or agreements in lieu of demarcation. In the 
Levant Ankara’s interest and policy objectives are similar to EU-NATO. The interest of 
Turkey are influenced by the degree of respect that Middle East Muslims have for Turkey 
and the AKP’s search for a privileged position of influence in the region informed by 
nostalgic reference to Turkey’s Ottoman legacy. Turkey’s relationships and diplomacy in 
the Levant illuminates the difference between the AKP and EU-NATO policy 
conceptualization; Turkey believes a dialogue including all actors is required to reach a 
lasting peace whereas the European institutions to a greater degree determine its regional 
interaction with state and non-state actors through consensus mechanisms and democratic 
value judgments.  
In both the South Caucasus and the Levant, Turkey cultivated relationships 
supporting “zero problems” and the “strategic depth” concepts espoused by Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Davutoglu. The AKP approaches regional exigencies pragmatically in its 
effort to meet perceived Turkish national interest. Ankara intends to increase its strategic 
depth by maintaining and cultivating ties with states and non-state actors along its 
periphery that potentially impact Turkey’s stability, security, and economic opportunities, 
even if the actor is viewed negatively by the international community, Hamas for 
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example. The EU ENP and NATO PfP policies demands democratic alignment for 
partner countries; the empirical evidence suggest democratic values are not part of the 
AKP’s criteria for diplomatic relationships. The AKP, for instance, remained silent while 
the West applauded the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, but Turkey, in line with the 
West, supported calls for Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak to step down in 2011, and 
supported NATO operations against Libyan president Gaddafi that same year. The factor 
which shaped the AKP’s reaction to the Rose Revolution is Russia’s lukewarm view of 
the event; Turkey viewed its interest as outweighing the normative model in this 
particular case.  
The view held in some Western capitals that Turkey is losing its Western 
perspective and is drifting eastward is derived from several factors: Ankara’s refusal to 
allow U.S. forces to invade Iraq from Turkish territory in 2003; the AKP’s recent pre-
civil war relationship with Assad’s Syria and Kaddafi’s Libya; Erdoğan’s past support for 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (currently under charges indictment by the 
International Criminal Court); Ankara’s opposition to sanctions against Iran; and 
Turkey’s relationship with Hamas, and the related fallout between Tel-Aviv and Ankara 
following the 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla incident. Some critics also look to such minor 
events as Erdoğan’s years in the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) during which the young 
leader spent four months jail term in 1999 for publicly reciting what was defined as an 
Islamists poem, or the writings of Davutoglu where Islamic political thought is conceived 
as an alternative approach to the normative Western institutions and ways of thinking 
about the world.176 The analysis suggest the AKP’s foreign policy choices that appear to 
signal an eastward shift, such as relations with Iran and Syria prior to the current Syrian 
civil war, are driven by underlying contextual nuances that speak to the overall concept 
of a multi-vectored and pragmatic approach to foreign affairs. 
The above examples signaling that Turkey is decoupling from the West must be 
weighed against the AKP’s record demonstrating the status-quo commitment to European 
security institutions (and the U.S.), such as the AKP’s early efforts to accelerate EU 
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membership, continuing support and participation in international regimes, allowing 
NATO BMD sites on Turkish soil in the face of Russian and Iranian protest, and 
providing multiple operational headquarters for ISAF. The evidence provides concrete 
examples of long-term Turkish commitment to NATO and indirect support to EU 
strategic objectives. Moreover, the thesis used history from the Ottoman era to the 
present to demonstrate Turkish Islam is subjugated to central political authority versus a 
caliph. The AKP’s policies are generally moored to democratic principles; however, of 
late Erdoğan is demonstrating authoritarian proclivities. 
The research in this study is limited to the foreign policies of Europe’s primary 
security institutions and Turkey’s AKP in two sub-regions of common interest. Further 
study delving into the domestic sociopolitical and economic influences on EU-NATO 
and Turkey’s foreign policy decisions, and analysis of overlapping EU-NATO and 
Turkey policy positions in regions, such as the Balkans, North Africa, and the broader 
Middle East potentially provides deeper insight into the roots of dissonance and 
cooperation between Turkey and Europe. Analysis of the political influence held by 
Europe’s growing Muslim populations (both citizen and non-citizen) perhaps sheds light 
on future EU-NATO positions relating to the MENA. Indeed, study of Turkey’s influence 
over its European Diaspora potentially sheds light on Ankara’s potential to shape certain 
aspects of European foreign policy. Is Turkey’s bi-lateral relationships with MENA 
countries and non-state actors such as Hamas merely one aspect of the AKP’s multi-
directional concept?  
Brussels and Ankara must determine the opportunities and dilemmas presented by 
converging regional interest. Turkey’s importance to Europe in the South Caucasus, the 
Levant, and other regions bordering Turkey is likely to grow in the long-term. In the 
South Caucasus Ankara’s role in Europe’s energy security and diversification is vital and 
growing gradually whereas the Syrian civil war adds a degree of urgency and volatility to 
future interactions between EU-NATO and Turkey. Continued dominance by the AKP 
allows one to speculate on the shape and quality of future Brussels-Ankara relations and 
policy interaction.  
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